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ABSTRACT		 The	idea	that	friendship	is	an	illusory	connection	that	may	only	exist	in	philosophers’	writings	was	a	subject	of	interest	for	many	of	the	early	modern	writers.	Writers	like	Thomas	Elyot,	Thomas	Churchyard,	and	Michel	de	Montaigne	attempted	to	uphold	idealized	traditions	of	friendship;	conversely,	Shakespeare,	along	with	writers	such	as	Francis	Bacon,	presented	early	modern	perceptions	of	idealized	friendship	only	to	confront	and	challenge	the	precepts.	In	The	Merchant	of	Venice	and	Othello,	the	Moor	of	
Venice,	Shakespeare	expresses	a	sometimes	cynical	yet	realistic	approach	toward	idealized	friendship.	He	exposes	the	problem	of	upholding	the	idealized	early	modern	version	of	amity	in	order	to	present	a	more	realistic	representation	of	friendship.	
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INTRODUCTION		 “Those	friends	thou	hast,	and	their	adoption	tried,	/	Grapple	them	unto	thy	soul	with	hoops	of	steel”	Polonius	advises	Laertes	in	Shakespeare’s	Hamlet	(1.3.62-3).	In	the	same	play,	Hamlet	declares	to	Horatio,	his	closest	friend	and	confidant,	“Give	me	a	man	/	That	is	not	passion’s	slave,	and	I	will	wear	him	/	In	my	heart’s	core,	ay,	in	my	heart	of	heart,	/	As	I	do	thee”	(3.2.70-73).	In	Hamlet	Shakespeare	implies	that	friendship	is	both	elusive	and	valuable.	If	Shakespeare’s	notions	are	accurate,	what	makes	friendship	difficult	to	obtain	yet	precious	to	possess?	Is	it	that	every	individual	longs	for	that	special	connection	with	another	person,	yet	because	humans	are	flawed	creatures,	they	eventually	abandon	their	idealistic	notions	of	friendship	since	they	are	aware	of	their	own	shortcomings?			 These	questions	are	not	easily	answered,	yet	it	is	obvious	by	his	works	that	Shakespeare	considered	friendship	a	relevant	topic	of	his	time.	The	idea	that	true	friendship	is	an	illusory	connection	that	may	only	exist	in	philosophers’	writings	was	a	subject	of	interest	for	many	of	the	early	modern	writers.	Writers	like	Thomas	Elyot,	Thomas	Churchyard,	and	Michel	de	Montaigne	attempted	to	uphold	the	idealized	traditions	of	friendship;	conversely,	Shakespeare,	along	with	writers	such	as	Francis	Bacon,	presented	early	modern	perceptions	of	idealized	friendship	only	to	confront	and	challenge	the	precepts.			 Over	the	course	of	this	thesis,	I	demonstrate	how	Shakespeare	exposes	the	problem	of	upholding	the	idealized	early	modern	version	of	friendship	specifically	in	The	
Merchant	of	Venice	and	Othello,	the	Moore	of	Venice.	My	argument,	of	course,	is	not	the	first	of	its	kind.	Laurie	Shannon	and	Tom	MacFaul,	for	example,	have	extensively	explored	in	recent	years	the	topic	of	early	modern	friendship.	Whereas	my	thesis	more	closely	
		2	
resembles	MacFaul’s	opinions,	my	conclusions	on	the	subject	vary.	In	Male	Friendship	in	
Shakespeare	and	his	Contemporaries,	MacFaul	sums	up	his	argument	in	the	following	lines:	“Most	of	Shakespeare’s	plays	and	much	of	the	writing	of	the	period	are	shaped	by	the	Humanist	ideal	of	true	friendship,	even	when	they	are	aware	that	it	is	a	will	o’	the	wisp,	but	its	main	effect	is	to	create	a	self	assertive	individuality	coloured	and	limited	by	the	failure	of	this	ideal”	(1).	While	I	agree	with	MacFaul’s	assessment	that	Shakespeare	is	aware	of	the	shortcomings	of	early	modern	idealized	friendship,	I	differ	on	his	conclusion	that	Shakespeare	intended	to	“create	a	self	assertive	individuality	(1).”	While	this	may	be	a	by-product	of	his	works,	I	maintain	that	Shakespeare	confronts	and	challenges	the	well-known	tradition	of	idealized	friendship	in	order	to	present	a	more	realistic	representation	of	friendship.	While	friendships	may	be	both	valuable	and	elusive,	they	are	also	made	imperfect	by	the	fallibility	of	its	participants,	and	Shakespeare’s	intention	is	to	reflect	those	imperfections.		 Shakespeare	himself	gives	some	insight	of	his	intention	to	reveal	human	nature	as	it	is	through	one	of	his	characters.	In	Hamlet,	Prince	of	Denmark,	Hamlet	gives	advice	to	a	group	of	players	on	the	proper	way	to	perform	a	play:	Suit	the	action	to	the	word,	the	word	to	the	action,	with	this	special	observance,	that	you	o’erstep	not	the	modesty	of	nature.	For	anything	so	o’erdone	is	from	the	purpose	of	playing,	whose	end,	both	at	the	first	and	now,	was	and	is	to	hold	as	‘twere	the	mirror	up	to	nature,	to	show	virtue	her	feature,	scorn	her	own	image,	and	the	very	age	and	body	of	the	time	his	form	and	pressure.	(3.2.17-24)	
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Though	Hamlet	is	remarking	on	the	actual	performance	of	the	actors,	the	implications	of	his	words	reach	further.	I	argue	by	presenting	the	concepts	of	idealized	friendship	and	exposing	their	unrealistic	qualities,	paradoxically	Shakespeare	is	in	fact	holding	a	mirror	up	to	reveal	accurate	portrayals	of	true-to-life	friendships.	While	the	realities	of	friendship	may	not	correspond	with	the	idealized	version	of	amity,	the	relationships	Shakespeare	offers	are	in	a	sense	“truer”	than	any	model	of	perfect	amity	since	they	reveal	what	is	instead	of	what	could	be.		 Before	Shakespeare	wrote	his	famous	tragedy	Hamlet,	however,	conceptions	of	amity	had	permeated	the	humanistic	schoolrooms	of	Renaissance	England	decades	earlier	through	the	writings	of	Aristotle	and	Cicero.	Laurie	Shannon	maintains	that	Cicero’s	De	
amicitia	served	“an	astonishingly	key	role	in	the	school	curricula	formulated	by	humanist	and	education	writers”	(26-27).	Tom	MacFaul	asserts	in	Male	Friendship	in	Shakespeare	
and	his	Contemporaries	that	humanism	shaped	the	concept	of	friendship,	which	ultimately	took	much	of	its	ideology	from	the	classical	writer	Cicero	(7).	He	notes	that	while	Cicero’s	writings	owed	much	to	Aristotle,	Cicero	“was	often	taken	as	an	authority	by	early	Renaissance	Humanists”	(7).	Robert	Stretter,	however,	maintains	that	Aristotle	afforded	ample	inspiration	for	early	modern	writers	with	his	Nicomachean	Ethics	(347-348).	Likewise,	Henry	S.	Turner	declares	of	Nicomachean	Ethics,	“It	was	by	far	the	most	commonly	owned	of	Aristotle’s	books,	appearing	in	both	public	and	private	inventories	two,	three,	or	even	four	times	as	often	as	other	Aristotelian	works,	including	the	Politics”	(416).	These	classical	writings,	so	ingrained	in	the	fabric	of	Renaissance	society,	prompted	many	writers	of	the	period	to	explore	the	highly	idealized	versions	of	friendship	these	writings	presented.	
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	 Renaissance	writers’	view	of	classical	friendship	did	not	simply	imitate	their	sources;	their	writings	also	attempted	to	serve	as	didactic	models	for	relationships	of	amity.	According	to	Lauren	J.	Mills,	“When,	thanks	to	the	printing-press	and	the	enthusiasm	of	the	humanists,	the	philosophical	and	ethical	aspects	of	classical	friendship	became	familiar	to	a	larger	number	of	people—people	who	had	embraced	the	Renaissance	delight	in	the	life	here	and	now—the	purpose	of	those	who	disseminated	the	classical	ideas	was	didactic”	(376).	The	idea	that	literature	could	function	as	a	teaching	tool	was	a	popular	notion	borrowed	from	the	classics	and	elaborated	on	by	writers	such	as	Sir	Philip	Sidney.	In	A	Defence	of	Poesy	he	argues	the	purpose	of	poetry	is	twofold:	“Poesy	therefore	is	an	art	of	imitation,	for	so	Aristotle	termeth	it	in	the	word	mimesis—that	is	to	say,	a	representing,	counterfeiting,	or	figuring	forth—to	speak	metaphorically,	speaking	picture—with	this	end,	to	teach	and	delight”	(217).	While	many	of	the	writings	specific	to	early	modern	friendship	do	not	fall	exclusively	into	the	category	of	poetry,	the	view	that	literature	in	general	should	instruct	the	reader	as	well	as	entertain	gave	inspiration	for	some	early	modern	writers	to	produce	conceptions	of	amity	that	proposed	possibilities	rather	than	actualities.	As	Aristotle	argues	in	The	Poetics,	“It	is	apparent	from	what	has	been	said	that	it	is	not	the	business	of	the	poet	to	tell	what	has	happened,	but	what	might	happen	and	what	is	possible	according	to	probability	or	necessity”	(81).	Therefore,	the	idealized	version	of	friendship	posited	during	the	early	modern	period	presented	a	model	of	friendship	to	be	emulated,	and	many	writers	endeavored	to	show	their	friendships	exemplified	perfect	amity.	French	philosopher	Michel	de	Montaigne,	for	instance,	incorporates	and	expands	the	ancient	
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philosophers’	idea	of	friends	as	other	selves1	when	he	describes	his	relationship	with	Etienne	de	La	Boétie:		Our	souls	were	yoked	together	in	such	unity,	and	contemplated	each	other	with	so	ardent	an	affection,	and	with	the	same	affection	revealed	each	other	right	down	to	the	very	entrails,	that	not	only	did	I	know	his	mind	as	well	as	I	knew	my	own	but	I	would	have	entrusted	myself	to	him	with	greater	assurance	than	to	myself.	(213)	Montaigne’s	interpretation	of	his	friendship	with	La	Boétie	presents	not	only	a	perfect	friendship	but	also	functions	as	a	didactic	tool	for	idealized	friendship.	David	Schalkwyk	asserts,	“Montaigne’s	essay	‘On	Friendship’	may	be	read	as	a	conventional	summation	of	almost	all	of	the	central	precepts	laid	down	by	Aristotle	and	Cicero”	(143).			 Prior	to	Montaigne	and	Sidney,	Thomas	Elyot’s	idealized	account	of	friendship	in	Renaissance	England	served	as	an	early	paradigm	for	perfect	amity.	In	“The	wonderfull	history	of	Titus	and	Gisippus,	and	whereby	is	fully	declared	the	figure	of	perfect	amitie”	in	
The	Boke	Named	the	Governour,	Elyot	remarks	that	his	account	“shall	ministre	to	the	redars	singuler	pleasure	and	also	incredible	comforte	to	practise	amitie”	(166).	He	uses	Titus	and	Gisippus	as	examples	of	true	friends	who	share	so	close	a	bond	that	Gisippus	willingly	relinquishes	his	bride-to-be	to	Titus	when	he	learns	that	his	friend	has	fallen	in	love	with	his	fiancé.	In	return,	when	Gisippus	is	accused	of	murder,	Titus	saves	him	from	certain	
																																																								1	Regarding	friends	as	other	selves,	Aristotle	claims,	“A	friend,	being	another	self,	furnishes	what	a	man	cannot	provide	by	his	own	effort"	(176).	Likewise,	Cicero	declares,	“But	besides,	friendship	is	like	a	looking	glass,	which	every	time	we	view	it,	gives	us	a	representation	of	our	very	selves”	(15).	
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death.2	Laurie	Shannon	presents	Thomas	Elyot’s	story	of	Titus	and	Gisippus	as	an	example	to	show	the	instructional	quality	of	Cicero’s	De	Amicitia:		Elyot	himself	provides	an	analysis	justifying	De	Amicitia’s	special	educational	suitability	as	well	as	its	popularity	from	a	humanist	viewpoint,	whether	in	Latin,	English,	or	even	pictorial	version.	Friendship	calls	up	a	limited	set	of	undisputed	models	(Damon	and	Pythias,	Orestes	and	Pylades,	and	Sometimes	Harmodious	and	Aristogiton,	Theseus	and	Pirithous,	or	Alexander	and	Hephaestion)...In	these	two	respects,	friendship	especially	rewards	the	humanist’s	familiar	faith	in	the	use	of	examples	and	his	advocacy	of	pleasure	and	sweetness	as	spurs	to	learning.	Friendship	discourses	seem	perfectly	cast	to	serve	the	reader	as	such	pedagogical	writers	theorized	him”	(29-30).	The	instructional	quality	employed	by	Elyot	and	other	early	modern	writers	demonstrates	their	goal	to	teach	an	idealized	view	of	friendship	using	classical	traditions.	The	likelihood	that	friendships	could	reach	this	idealized	and	therefore	unrealistic	portrait	of	amity	created	a	tradition,	as	MacFaul	contends,	“ripe	for	debunking”	(10).3		 Before	the	debunking	of	idealized	friendship,	however,	the	writings	of	Aristotle	and	Cicero	generated	models	of	amity	for	early	modern	writers	to	follow.	Since	Cicero’s	concepts	of	friendship	were	intertwined	with	Aristotle’s,	both	philosophers	considered																																																									2	John	D.	Cox	argues	Elyot’s	attempt	at	illustrating	a	model	friendship	is	more	about	rivalry	and	less	about	perfect	amity,	“Though	Eloyt	[Elyot]	repeatedly	insists	that	the	story	illustrates	perfect	mutual	friendship,	what	it	really	illustrates	is	Titus’s	surrender	in	the	competition	for	moral	perfection,	when	faced	with	Gisippus’	superior	ability	to	compete”	(14).		3	While	I	agree	with	MacFaul	that	these	models	of	friendship	were	“ripe	for	debunking”	(10),	I	would	also	argue	that	because	of	their	didactic	nature,	these	paradigms	of	amity	were	meant	to	be	impossible	to	achieve.	The	unattainable	qualities	offered	by	classical	and	early	modern	writers	served	only	as	examples	to	follow.	That	being	said,	some	writers,	such	as	Montaigne,	attempted	to	prove	their	friendships	met	or	exceeded	those	unrealistic	qualities	of	friendship.	Their	attempts,	of	course,	left	them	open	to	“debunking.”			
		7	
some	of	the	same	attributes	essential	for	true	friendship	to	exist.	In	Nicomachean	Ethics,	Aristotle	identifies	three	basic	kinds	of	friendship:	friendship	for	good,	friendship	for	utility,	and	friendship	for	pleasure	(144).	The	most	important	of	these	friendships,	according	to	the	philosopher,	is	the	friendship	based	on	shared	or	mutual	virtue:	“Perfect	friendship	is	the	friendship	of	men	who	are	good,	and	alike	in	virtue”	(145).	He	argues	while	the	other	two	friendships	may	exist	between	“bad	men”	(147),	true	friendship	cannot	last	without	virtue.	Similarly,	Cicero	states,	“Virtue	is	the	product	and	preserver	of	friendship,	both	gives	life	to	it,	and	preserves	its	existence.	For	friendship	neither	appears	nor	continues,	where	virtue	is	wanting”	(13).	Cicero’s	dialogue	extols	virtuous	amity	as	the	only	true	form	of	friendship.	He	warns	against	faults	such	as	flattery4	that	could	harm	or	potentially	destroy	a	friendship.	Aristotle’s	view	of	amity,	however,	conveys	a	more	realistic	approach.	He	recognizes	that	although	the	best	kind	of	friendship	is	based	on	virtue,	few	friendships	reach	the	pinnacle	of	perfect	friendship	status.	He	differentiates	the	friendships	of	utility	and	pleasure	in	terms	of	self-interest:	Therefore	those	who	love	because	of	utility	love	because	of	what	is	good	for	
themselves,	and	those	who	love	because	of	pleasure	do	so	because	of	what	is	pleasant	to	themselves,	and	not	because	of	who	the	loved	person	is	but	in	so	far	as	he	is	useful	or	pleasant.	And	thus	these	friendships	are	only	incidental;	for	it	is	not	as	being	the	man	he	is	that	the	loved	person	is	loved,	but	as	providing	some	good	or	pleasure.	(144)	
																																																								4	Concerning	flattery	Cicero	declares,	“Now	counterfeit	and	flattery	may	serve	a	turn	and	gain	the	sycophant’s	ends:	but	in	true	friendship	there	is	nothing	of	feint	or	the	flatterer:	for	the	nature	of	it	is	to	be	genuine	and	sincere,	and	then	this	is	conviction	enough	to	the	world,	that	friendship	rather	seems	to	take	its	rise	and	spring	from	our	natures,	than	owe	its	birth	to	a	sense	of	want	and	indigence”	(18-19).	
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Aristotle	maintains	that	these	flawed	friendships	eventually	dissolve	since	their	foundations	cannot	withstand	the	pressures	of	change.	When	the	usefulness	or	the	pleasure	no	longer	exists	for	these	friendships,	they	are	doomed	to	failure.	Conversely,	the	good	and	virtuous	friendship,	which	promotes	selflessness	between	friends,	contains	both	usefulness	and	pleasure.5	These	kinds	of	friendships	endure	because	of	their	virtuous	nature.	While	Aristotle	recognizes	that	inferior	forms	of	friendship	exist,	he	undermines	his	own	observation	by	arguing	that	the	friendships	of	utility	and	pleasure	cannot	last,	which	ultimately	leaves	virtuous	friendship	as	the	only	true,	enduring	form	of	amity.		 Early	modern	writers	such	as	Walter	Dorke	and	Thomas	Churchyard	echo	the	classical	philosophers’	sentiments	regarding	virtue	as	an	essential,	if	not	the	essential,	characteristic	for	true	friendship.	In	Dorke’s	treatise	A	tipe	or	figure	of	friendship,	he	claims,	Wherefore	the	friendship	is	spoken	of	in	this	place,	is	not	the	tirannicall	friendship	of	the	holy	league,	nor	the	filthie	friendship,	of	the	false	named	familie	of	loue,	nor	the	forward	friendship	which	a	man	may	finde	at	Billingsgate	for	a	boxe	on	the	ear,	nor	the	profitable	friendship	which	is	among	Merchants,	nor	the	pleasant	friendship	which	is	among	Courtiers,	nor	the	common	friendship	which	is	among	Clownes:	but	it	is	the	true,	perfect,	and	vnfeyned	friendship,	which	is	neither	for	pleasure	partely,	nor	for	profit	chiefely,	but	for	vertues	sake	onely.	Dorke’s	description	catalogues	the	various	kinds	of	so-called	friendships,	yet	the	first	part	of	his	list	reads	like	an	indictment	of	harmful	relationships:	“tirannicall,”	“filthie,”	and																																																									5	“And	each	is	good	without	qualification	and	to	his	friend,	for	the	good	are	both	good	without	qualification	and	useful	to	each	other.	So	too	they	are	pleasant;	for	the	good	are	pleasant	both	without	qualification	and	to	each	other,	since	to	each	his	own	activities	and	others	like	them	are	pleasurable,	and	the	actions	of	the	good	are	the	same	or	like”	(Aristotle	145).	
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“false.”	Reiterating	Aristotle’s	three	kinds	of	friendship,	he	dismisses	all	other	forms	of	amity	except	the	virtuous.	By	calling	virtuous	friendship	the	“true,	perfect”	form	of	friendship,	he	implies	that	the	rest	are	imperfect	at	best	or	false	at	worst.	Instead,	his	interpretation	more	closely	resembles	Cicero’s	reflections:	Mistake	me	not,	I	am	not	describing	that	outward	and	shallow	part	of	friendship	which	perhaps	may	please,	and	have	its	advantages	too;	but	I	am	discoursing	and	speaking	of	the	nature	and	constitution	of	perfect	and	ingenuous	friendship,	which	is	practiced	and	entertained	but	by	an	inconfideable	part	of	the	world.	(15)	Dorke,	like	Cicero,	does	not	view	friendships	other	than	virtuous	friendship	as	alternative	forms	of	amity.	While	Aristotle	eventually	argues	that	only	virtuous	friendship	can	last	and	therefore	is	the	only	true	form	of	amity,	he	acknowledges	that	less	virtuous	forms	of	amity	exist.		 Thomas	Churchyard	in	A	Sparke	of	Frendship	asserts	that	virtue	is	the	preeminent	characteristic	required	for	genuine	friendship,		I	say	and	proue	that	the	same	is	true	friendship	that	proceedes	from	virtue,	and	hath	so	noble	a	nature	(by	a	diuine	motion	of	goodnesse)	that	neither	vice	can	corrupt,	nor	any	kind	of	vanitie	vanquish:	For	where	it	taketh	roote,	it	buds	so	beautifully	that	it	bringeth	foorth	an	euelasting	fruite,	whose	taste	is	more	sweete	and	precious,	than	can	bee	easely	imagined.	Although	his	description	is	similar	to	Dorke’s	in	respect	to	virtue,	Churchyard’s	vivid	use	of	imagery	appeals	to	the	aesthetic	quality	that	Sidney	values.	Specifically,	fruit	is	both	pleasant	to	look	at	and	also	useful	to	eat;	therefore,	Churchyard’s	description	of	true	
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friendship	reiterates	the	pleasant	and	useful	quality	of	amity	that	Aristotle	suggests	comes	from	a	perfect	friendship.6	Nevertheless,	both	descriptions	of	true	friendship	model	closely	Aristotle	and	Cicero	by	emphasizing	virtue	as	the	central	trait	needed	to	experience	true	and	lasting	amity.		 While	both	Aristotle	and	Cicero	regard	virtue	as	a	critical	component	of	true	friendship,	their	observations	suggest	that	men	must	share	some	form	of	equality	or	likeness	in	order	to	sustain	a	friendship.	Aristotle’s	view	of	men	“alike	in	virtue”	(145)	recommends	equality	through	goodness	take	precedence	over	other	traits	such	as	status	or	wealth.	While	social	and	economic	equality	encourages	friendships	between	men,	Aristotle	believes	virtue	equalizes	and	helps	sustain	friendships.	He	queries	whether	truly	good	men—hence,	happy	men—actually	need	friends;	he	then	answers	his	own	query:	“A	friend,	being	another	self,	furnishes	what	a	man	cannot	provide	by	his	own	effort”	(176).	A	friend	acting	as	“another	self”	must	also	be	good	or	virtuous	since	it	is	their	likeness	that	gives	them	equality.7	Anyone	other	than	a	virtuous	man	would	have	questionable	motives.	Aristotle	does,	however,	offer	concessions	for	friendships	of	inequality:	In	all	friendships	implying	inequality	the	love	also	should	be	proportional,	i.e.	the	better	should	be	more	loved	than	he	loves,	and	so	should	the	more	useful,	and	similarly	in	each	of	the	other	cases;	for	when	the	love	is	in	proportion	to																																																									6	“Now	those	who	wish	well	to	their	friends	for	their	sake	are	most	truly	friends;	for	they	do	this	by	reason	of	their	own	nature	and	not	incidentally;	therefore	their	friendship	lasts	as	long	as	they	are	good-and	goodness	is	an	enduring	thing.	And	each	is	good	without	qualification	and	to	his	friend,	for	the	good	are	both	good	without	qualification	and	useful	to	each	other.	So	too	they	are	pleasant;	for	the	good	are	pleasant	both	without	qualification	and	to	each	other,	since	to	each	his	own	activities	and	others	like	them	are	pleasurable,	and	the	actions	of	the	good	are	the	same	or	like.	And	such	as	friendship	is,	as	might	be	expected,	permanent,	since	there	meet	in	it	all	the	qualities	that	friendship	should	have”	(Aristotle	145).		7	“Each,	then,	both	loves	what	is	good	for	himself,	and	makes	an	equal	return	in	goodwill	and	in	pleasantness;	for	friendship	is	said	to	be	equality,	and	both	of	these	are	found	most	in	the	friendship	of	the	good”	(Aristotle	148).	
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the	merit	of	the	parties,	then	in	a	sense	arises	equality,	which	is	certainly	held	to	be	characteristic	of	friendship.	(150)	If	disparities	exist	between	friends,	love	must	compensate	for	the	inequities.	Love	does	not	guarantee	that	the	friendship	will	last	since	equality	is	a	characteristic	necessary	for	a	true	friendship.	If	the	disproportion	is	too	great	for	love	to	compensate	for	each	other’s	deficiencies,	the	friendship	will	not	survive.		 Like	Aristotle,	Cicero	takes	a	similar	view	of	equality	believing	that	a	true	friend	will	be	a	reflection	of	his	friend:	“Friendship	is	like	a	looking	glass,	which	every	time	we	view	it,	gives	us	a	representation	of	our	very	selves”	(15).	This	depiction	of	a	friend	as	a	mirrored	image	implies	mutuality	between	friends.	Specifically,	Cicero	argues	intelligence,	actions,	and	temperament	as	equalizers	between	men,	but	only	for	good	men	who	respect	each	other.8	He	also	concludes	that	equality	will	help	sustain	a	friendship:	“The	strongest	cement	to	preserve	friendship	when	once	united,	is	for	both	parties	to	be	upon	a	level,	and	neither	of	them	to	claim	a	precedency,	that	possible	may	be	due	to	their	merit”	(44).	Like	Aristotle,	Cicero	concludes	that	love,	which	is	necessary	for	virtue,	is	the	great	equalizer	between	friends.9	Both	philosophers	maintain	that	equality	must	exist	in	some	form	in	order	for	friendship	to	endure.	
																																																								8	“To	which	we	may	add	another	consideration	of	no	small	weight;	namely,	there	is	no	cause	so	powerful	in	the	production	of	its	effects,	as	resemblance	and	conformity	in	mind	and	manners,	is	to	create	friendship.	Conformable	to	which,	we	see	good	men	to	have	a	natural	tendency,	and	respect	one	for	the	other;	and	from	the	natural	likeness	in	their	temper	associate	together	as	friends	and	kinsmen;	for	nothing	gives	greater	proof	of	its	tendency	and	love	for	similar	qualities	than	nature”	(Cicero	33).	9	“It	is	love,	the	very	being	and	soul	of	friendship,	that	is	the	principle	of	union	and	the	foundation	of	good	nature”	(Cicero	18).		
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	 In	the	story	of	Titus	and	Gissipus,	taken	from	the	Boccaccio’s	Decameron,	early	modern	writer	Thomas	Elyot	undergirds	and	exceeds	the	idea	of	another	self	by	emphasizing	the	matched	perfection	of	the	two	friends,		This	Chremes	hapned	to	haue	also	a	sone	named	Gisippus,	who	nat	onely	was	equall	to	the	said	yonge	Titus	in	yeres,	but	also	in	stature,	proporcion	of	body,	fauour,	and	colour	of	visage,	countenaunce,	and	speche.	The	two	children	were	so	like,	that	without	moche	difficultie	it	could	not	be	discerned	of	their	proper	parentes,	which	was	Titus	from	Gysippus,	or	Gysippus	from	Titus.	These	two	yonge	gentilmen,	as	they	seemed	to	be	one	in	fourme	and	personage,	so,	shortely	after	acquaintaunce,	the	same	nature	wrought	in	their	hartes	suche	a	mutuall	affection,	that	their	willes	and	appetites	daily	more	and	more	so	confederated	them	selfes	whan	their	names	were	declared,	but	that	they	hadde	had	onely	chaunged	their	places,	issuinge	(as	I	mought	say)	out	of	the	one	body,	and	entringe	in	to	the	other.	(166-167)	Comparable	to	Montaigne’s	instantaneous	friendship	with	La	Boétie,10	Elyot’s	description	of	Titus	and	Gisippus	stresses	their	likeness	in	body,	mind,	and	spirit.	The	equality	paradigm	Elyot	presents	served	as	an	important	contribution	to	the	early	modern	readers	conception	of	friendship.	According	to	Mills,	in	England	the	story	“gives	the	earliest	fully	elaborated	friendship	story	to	appear	in	the	sixteenth	century”	(99).			 Another	essential	component	of	classical	and	Renaissance	friendship	stressed	almost	exclusively	male	amity.	The	emphasis	placed	on	male	friendship	likely	stemmed																																																									10	“Having	so	short	a	period	to	last,	having	begun	so	late	(for	we	were	both	grown	men	–	he	more	than	a	few	years	older	than	I)	–	it	had	not	time	to	waste	on	following	the	pattern	of	those	slacker	ordinary	friendships	which	require	so	much	prudent	foresight	in	long	preliminary	acquaintance”	(Montaigne	212).		
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from	the	classical	curriculum	of	England’s	educational	system	and	early	modern	thought	regarding	women.	The	belief	that	women’s	purpose	in	life	was	to	marry,	bear	children,	and	be	in	subjection	to	their	husbands	was	a	common	thread	throughout	Renaissance	society.	The	mindset	of	the	patriarchal	system	in	the	sixteenth	and	seventeenth	centuries	subjugated	women	with	law	and	religion	supporting	their	principles.			 Montaigne	contends	that	amity	between	men	and	women—specifically	husbands	and	wives—cannot	possibly	meet	the	criterion	for	a	meaningful	friendship	that	only	two	men	can	experience:	As	for	marriage,	apart	from	being	a	bargain	when	only	the	entrance	is	free	(its	duration	being	fettered	and	constrained,	depending	on	things	outside	our	will),	it	is	a	bargain	struck	for	other	purposes;	within	it	you	soon	have	to	unsnarl	hundreds	of	extraneous	tangled	ends,	which	are	enough	to	break	the	thread	of	living	passion	and	to	trouble	its	course,	whereas	in	friendship	there	is	no	traffic	of	commerce	but	with	itself.	In	addition,	woman	are	in	truth	not	normally	capable	of	responding	to	such	familiarity	and	mutual	confidence	as	sustain	that	holy	bond	of	friendship,	nor	do	their	souls	seem	firm	enough	to	withstand	the	clasp	of	a	knot	so	lasting	and	so	tightly	drawn.	And	indeed	if	it	were	possible	to	fashion	such	a	relationship,	willing	and	free,	in	which	not	only	the	souls	had	this	full	enjoyment	but	in	which	the	bodies	too	shared	in	the	union.	.	.where	the	whole	human	being	was	involved	–	it	is	certain.	.	.that	the	loving-friendship	would	be	more	full	and	more	abundant.	But	there	is	no	example	yet	of	woman	attaining	to	it.	.	.	and	by	the	common	agreement	of	the	Ancient	schools	of	philosophy	she	is	excluded	from	it.	(210)	 	
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His	argument	stresses	women’s	inability	to	encounter	men	with	“mutual	confidence”	(210)	which	implies	that	they	cannot	respond	on	an	intellectual	level.	Invariably,	he	reduces	them	to	mentally	dwarfed	individuals	with	the	incapability	of	understanding	the	depth	of	which	two	souls	must	mingle	in	order	“to	sustain	that	holy	bond	of	friendship”	(210).	He	also	equates	marriage	with	a	form	of	institutional	slavery.	For	him	and	his	classical	predecessors,	friendships	must	come	from	a	mutual	agreement	between	two	individuals	who	are	not	forced	to	remain	friends,11	and	he	deems	marriage	an	obligatory	relationship	whereby	men	and	women	cannot	escape.	He	concedes	that	if	women	were	intellectually	and	emotionally	capable	of	a	lasting	friendship,	the	relationship	would	exceed	that	of	male	amity	since	they	would	also	connect	on	a	physical	level,	which	for	Montaigne	is	not	an	option	for	two	men.	He	believes	a	true	comingling	of	souls	between	friends	can	only	exist	between	two	intellectually	and	emotionally	equal	people.	Therefore,	he	excludes	women	from	the	possibility	of	forming	lasting,	true	friendships.		 According	to	MacFaul,	the	exclusionary	aspect	of	male	friendship	during	the	early	modern	period	was	less	about	women	and	more	about	men’s	psyche:	No	one,	in	our	society	or	Shakespeare’s,	feels	much	personal	stake	in	a	‘sum	of	male	power’.	If	anything,	humiliation	at	the	hands	of	another	man	is	more	powerfully	felt	because	more	power	is	at	stake...such	relationships	[of	exclusion]	are	obviously	not	only	about	women;	men	do	have	direct	needs	for	emotional	support	from	other	men,	more	so	in	the	early	modern	world,	owing	to	the	relative	powerlessness	of	women	to	help	them	in	an	unequal	society.	(3)																																																									11	This	argument	refers	to	the	idea	of	equality	between	friends.	If	men	are	equal,	they	are	not	forced	by	lack	of	money	or	status	to	remain	friends	with	someone	that	serves	a	utilitarian	purpose.	
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Ironically,	the	idealized	male	bonds	men	so	actively	pursued	and	protected	from	outside	forces	eventually	led	to	anxiety	and	disillusionment.			 The	leading	precepts	of	perfect	friendship—virtue,	equality,	and	maleness—idealized	by	classical	philosophers	and	early	modern	humanist	writers	eventually	gave	way	to	skepticism	by	the	early	1590s.12	The	inconsistency	between	idealized	qualities	of	amity	and	the	realities	of	friendship	created	an	atmosphere	of	suspicion	for	some	early	modern	writers.	Concerning	this	inconsistency,	Stretter	contends	that	“perfect	friendship	had	become	a	rigorously	theorized	tradition	with	a	canon	of	“laws”	set	down	in	proverbs	.	.	..	These	proverbs	and	their	implications	exerted	a	great	imaginative	force	as	writers	struggled	to	reconcile	the	theory	of	friendship	with	its	practice”	(348).	MacFaul	describes	friendship	during	this	time	as	“increasingly	untrustworthy”	(1),	and	Robert	C.	Evans	asserts,	“Flattery	and	false	friendships	were	topics	that	preoccupied	many	people	during	the	Renaissance”	(1).			 Francis	Bacon’s	essay	“Of	Friendship,”	for	example,	reflected	the	new	growing	skepticism	of	idealized	amity.	Though	he	recognized	the	importance	of	such	an	association—“I	have	given	the	rule,	where	a	man	cannot	fitly	play	his	own	part:	if	he	have	not	a	friend,	he	may	quit	the	stage”	(86)—his	reasons	for	friendship	contradict	the	idealized	qualities	admired	by	other	Renaissance	writers.	For	Bacon,	a	friend’s	usefulness	plays	a	significant	role	in	his	version	of	friendship.	His	description	of	the	fruits	of	friendship	is	similar	to	Churchyard’s,13	yet	his	attitude	varies	by	concentrating	on	the	benefits	of	
																																																								12	MacFaul,	Tom.	“Friendship	in	Sidney's	Arcadias.”	Studies	in	English	Literature,	1500-1900,	The	English	
Renaissance	49.1	(2009):	17-33.	JSTOR.	Web.	28	Jan.	2016.	(17).		13	“I	say	and	proue	that	the	same	is	true	friendship	that	proceedes	from	virtue,	and	hath	so	noble	a	nature	(by	a	diuine	motion	of	goodnesse)	that	neither	vice	can	corrupt,	nor	any	kind	of	vanitie	vanquish:	For	where	it	
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friendship	instead	of	the	unselfish	relationship	that	Churchyard	and	his	classical	predecessors	valued.	Bacon’s	first	fruit	of	friendship—“the	ease	and	discharge	of	the	fullness	and	swellings	of	the	heart”	(80)—	highlights	a	friend’s	usefulness	instead	of	mutuality	between	friends.	He	equates	a	friend	to	a	priest	by	which	the	friend	may	unburden	himself,	“But	a	true	friend,	to	whom	you	may	impart	griefs,	joys,	fears,	hopes,	suspicions,	counsels,	and	whatsoever	lieth	upon	the	heart	to	oppress	it,	in	a	kind	of	civil	shrift	or	confession”	(81).	The	“absolution”	that	the	friend	receives	is	not	a	reciprocal	experience;	instead,	the	burden	resides	with	the	friend.	He	cynically	notes	that	“kings	and	monarchs”	find	this	kind	of	friendship	so	indispensable	that	“they	purchase	it	many	times	at	the	hazard	of	their	own	safety	and	greatness”	(81).	While	he	understands	friendship	is	a	necessary	part	of	life,	Bacon	offers	a	rational	approach	to	the	qualities	of	amity	praised	by	humanist	writers.	Unlike	the	high-minded	conceptions	of	idealized	friendship	that	extol	close	bonds,	his	words	suggest	a	distrustful	or	perhaps	realistic	attitude	toward	human	nature.		 In	the	last	part	of	his	essay,	Bacon	reiterates	Aristotle’s	idea	of	another	self	but	for	practical	purposes.	He	argues	that	friends	can	serve	as	tools	to	implement	even	after	death:	Here	the	best	way	to	represent	to	life	the	manifold	use	of	friendship	is	to	cast	and	see	how	many	things	there	are	which	a	man	cannot	do	himself;	and	then	it	will	appear	that	it	was	a	sparing	speech	of	the	ancients,	to	say,	that	a	friend	
is	another	himself:	for	that	a	friend	is	far	more	than	himself.	Men	have	their	time,	and	die	many	times	in	desire	of	some	things	which	they	principally	take	
																																																																																																																																																																																		taketh	roote,	it	buds	so	beautifully	that	it	bringeth	foorth	an	euelasting	fruite,	whose	taste	is	more	sweete	and	precious,	than	can	bee	easely	imagined”	(Churchyard).		
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to	heart;	the	bestowing	of	a	child,	the	finishing	of	a	work,	or	the	like.	If	a	man	have	a	true	friend,	he	may	rest	almost	secure	that	the	care	of	those	things	will	continue	after	him.	(85-86)	Bacon’s	use	of	the	words	“almost	secure”	(86)	paints	a	cynical	picture	when	referring	to	what	a	“true	friend”	(86)	is	willing	to	do	for	his	deceased	friend.	Even	a	genuine	friend	he	holds	up	to	scrutiny.	His	distrust	suggests	that	no	person	can	ever	achieve	perfect	amity;	however,	his	attitude	toward	man’s	limitations	does	not	preclude	him	from	experiencing	a	satisfying	yet	imperfect	form	of	friendship.			 In	“Of	Followers	and	Friends”	Bacon	reiterates	his	pragmatic	approach	to	early	modern	friendship	by	taking	to	task	the	idealized	characteristics	of	equality	and	virtue.	He	says	of	equality,	“There	is	little	friendship	in	the	world,	and	least	of	all	between	equals,	which	was	wont	to	be	magnified.	That	that	is,	is	between	superior	and	inferior,	whose	fortunes	may	comprehend	the	one	the	other”	(147).	While	on	the	one	hand	he	cynically	notes	the	lack	of	real	friendship,	he	also	maintains	that	friendships	of	utility	serve	a	purpose.	Friendships	of	equality	cannot	further	a	friend’s	place	in	society;	instead,	the	interests	of	people	of	different	social	standing	may	be	mutually	beneficial.	And	though	he	understands	the	importance	of	virtue,	he	also	sees	it	as	potentially	problematic:	“And	besides,	to	speak	truth,	in	base	times	active	men	are	of	more	use	than	virtuous”	(146).	While	virtue	is	a	quality	to	be	admired,	he	observes	the	benefit	of	a	man	of	action	over	a	man	of	integrity.	Once	again,	Bacon	emphasizes	practical	or	useful	friendships	over	philosophical	constructs	of	idealized	amity.		 		 In	several	of	his	works,	Shakespeare	expresses	a	similar	cynical	yet	realistic	approach	toward	idealized	friendship.	At	times	he	parodies	friendships	like	that	of	Titus	
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and	Gisippus,	as	he	does	in	The	Two	Gentleman	of	Verona.	At	other	times	he	sheds	light	on	unrealistic	expectations	of	perfect	amity,	or	he	exposes	false	friendship	at	its	worst.	In	Chapter	One,	“An	Exposition	of	Inequity:	Disparities	of	Friendship	in	The	Merchant	of	
Venice,”	I	demonstrate	how	Shakespeare	reveals	his	skepticism	regarding	the	ability	to	uphold	concepts	of	idealized	friendship	perpetuated	by	classical	philosophers	and	early	modern	writers.	He	presents	incongruities	of	affection	between	Antonio,	the	merchant	of	Venice,	and	Bassanio,	the	prodigal	nobleman.	He	exposes	the	vulnerabilities	of	their	friendship	through	the	calculations	of	Shylock,	the	Jewish	moneylender	who	seeks	to	destroy	Antonio,	and	Portia,	Bassanio’s	love	interest	who	challenges	Antonio’s	position	with	Bassanio.	In	Chapter	Two,	“False	Friends:	Betrayal	of	Friendship	in	Othello,	the	Moor	of	
Venice,”	I	show	how	Shakespeare’s	character	Iago	abuses	the	idealized	qualities	of	early	modern	amity	in	order	to	betray	his	commanding	officer,	Othello.	He	fashions	himself	as	the	perfect	friend	worthy	of	Montaigne’s	description	of	La	Boétie,	yet	he	perverts	those	idealized	concepts	so	that	he	can	destroy	his	so-called	friend.	Both	chapters	examine	Shakespeare’s	dramatization	of	early	modern	idealized	friendship	and	how	he	exposes	its	weaknesses	through	an	accurate	portrayal	of	true-to-life	friendship.	
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CHAPTER	1	
	 An	Exposition	of	Inequity:	Disparities	of	Friendship	in	The	Merchant	of	Venice		 	On	the	subject	of	amity,	Cicero	and	Aristotle	afforded	much	inspiration	for	early	modern	writers.	Their	rigorous	tenets	of	friendship,	exclusive	to	male	amity,	created	a	tradition	of	perfect	friendship	that	many	writers	attempted	to	imitate.	While	both	Aristotle	and	Cicero	regard	virtue	as	a	key	element	of	true	friendship,	they	contend	that	men	must	share	some	form	of	equality	in	order	to	sustain	a	friendship.	Aristotle	asserts,	“A	friend,	being	another	self,	furnishes	what	a	man	cannot	provide	by	his	own	effort”	(176).	Similarly,	Cicero	argues,	“Friendship	is	like	a	looking	glass,	which	every	time	we	view	it,	gives	us	a	representation	of	our	very	selves”	(15).	Their	claim	is	that	men	who	are	“alike	in	virtue”	(Aristotle	145)	will	make	the	truest	friends.		 By	the	time	Shakespeare	wrote	his	poems	and	plays,	doubts	regarding	the	ability	to	uphold	these	paradigms	of	early	modern	friendship	began	to	permeate	the	literature	of	the	day.14	Writers	like	Francis	Bacon	viewed	friendships	not	as	idealized	bonds	but	rather	as	realistic	relationships	between	imperfect	human	beings.15	Similarly,	Shakespeare’s	characters	reveal	their	inability	to	sustain	the	impossible	precepts	of	idealized	friendship,	but	they	also	demonstrate	a	faithful	representation	of	human	interaction.	
																																																								14	Stretter	contends	that	“perfect	friendship	had	become	a	rigorously	theorized	tradition	with	a	canon	of	“laws”	set	down	in	proverbs	.	.	..	These	proverbs	and	their	implications	exerted	a	great	imaginative	force	as	writers	struggled	to	reconcile	the	theory	of	friendship	with	its	practice”	(348).		15	“Here	the	best	way	to	represent	to	life	the	manifold	use	of	friendship	is	to	cast	and	see	how	many	things	there	are	which	a	man	cannot	do	himself;	and	then	it	will	appear	that	it	was	a	sparing	speech	of	the	ancients,	to	say,	that	a	friend	is	another	himself:	for	that	a	friend	is	far	more	than	himself.	Men	have	their	time,	and	die	many	times	in	desire	of	some	things	which	they	principally	take	to	heart;	the	bestowing	of	a	child,	the	finishing	of	a	work,	or	the	like.	If	a	man	have	a	true	friend,	he	may	rest	almost	secure	that	the	care	of	those	things	will	continue	after	him”	(Bacon	85-86).		
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	 In	his	sonnets,	for	example,	Shakespeare	explores	among	other	things	a	friendship	between	an	older	man—the	speaker—and	a	younger	man,	the	object	of	the	speaker’s	affections.	Unlike	the	ideal	friendship	described	by	early	modern	writers	such	as	Michel	de	Montaigne	who	views	genuine	friendship	between	men	as	the	mingling	of	souls	“confounded	in	so	universal	a	blending	that	they	efface	the	seam	which	joints	them	together	so	that	it	cannot	be	found”	(212),	the	relationship	between	speaker	and	object	reflect	an	unequal	friendship	in	terms	of	age	and	social	status.	The	older	man	longs	for	the	young	man’s	affection	yet	realizes	that	the	young	man	may	be	incapable	of	experiencing	the	depth	of	friendship	he	feels.	In	Sonnet	71,	for	example,	he	urges	the	young	man,	“No	longer	mourn	for	me	when	I	am	dead”	(1).	Paradoxically,	by	cautioning	the	youth	to	forget	him	so	that	others	will	not	“mock”	(14)	him	for	his	sorrow,	the	older	man	in	fact	yearns	for	the	young	man	to	remember	him.	This	contradictory	reminder	to	forget	demonstrates	the	speaker’s	apprehension	regarding	the	young	man’s	true	affections	toward	him.	He	refuses,	however,	to	explicitly	ask	the	young	man	to	remember	him	for	fear	of	what	his	answer	might	be	since	he	has	proven	to	be,	if	not	entirely	in	the	eyes	of	the	speaker	but	in	the	eyes	of	the	audience,	a	self-loving,	self-serving	individual.	Though	the	speaker	attempts	to	circumvent	the	young	man’s	character	flaws,	the	fact	that	he	must	remind	the	young	man	to	forget	him	shows	that	the	speaker	recognizes	his	shortcomings	but	refuses	to	accept	them.			 Comparably,	in	Sonnet	35	the	bond	between	the	speaker	and	the	young	man	is	tested,	yet	the	older	man	still	makes	excuses	for	his	friend’s	disloyalty.	The	young	man	has	apparently	stolen	someone	from	the	speaker.	Although	the	reader	does	not	know	for	sure	the	specific	transgressions	of	the	youth,	the	speaker	does	refer	to	his	lapse	as	a	“sensual	fault”	(9).	Whether	this	is	a	reference	to	the	dark	lady	or	some	other	sexual	indiscretion,	
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the	speaker	does	not	make	clear,	but	once	again	the	likelihood	that	it	is	a	woman	that	has	come	between	them	seems	probable.	However,	even	though	the	speaker	feels	betrayed	by	the	young	man,	he	not	only	pardons	his	behavior	but	also	plays	his	judicial	advocate	by	exonerating	him	of	any	blame	and	becoming	his	accomplice	after	the	fact.	He	sides	with	the	young	man	and	justifies	his	conduct	by	expressing	the	idea	that	nothing	or	no	one	is	perfect.	The	speaker	consoles	him,	“No	more	be	grieved	at	that	which	thou	has	done.		Roses	have	thorns,	and	silver	fountains	mud,	/	Clouds	and	eclipses	stain	both	moon	and	sun”	(1-3).	Regarding	the	older	man’s	actions,	Eve	Kosofsky	Sedgewick	maintains,	“The	Sonnets’	poetic	goes	to	almost	any	length	to	treat	the	youth	as	a	moral	monolith”	(41).	The	speaker	is	willing	to	corrupt	himself	by	relieving	the	young	man	of	any	fault,	yet	he	may	suspect	that	that	the	young	man	is	not	truly	repentant	of	his	actions,	even	though	he	implies	at	the	beginning	of	the	poem	that	the	he	is	“grieved”	(1)	by	his	actions.	In	the	last	line	of	the	sonnet,	the	speaker	notes	that	the	“sweet	thief”	has	“sourly”	(14)	robbed	from	him.	The	word	sour	is	ambiguous,	but	it	could	imply	intentionality	on	the	part	of	the	young	man.	Regardless,	the	speaker	cares	more	for	the	young	man	than	any	betrayal	that	he	might	have	committed.			 The	speaker	renews	his	doubt	regarding	the	young	man’s	love	for	him	in	Sonnet	93.	He	has	resigned	himself	to	pretend	that	the	young	man	is	“true”	(1),	even	though	he	knows	he	is	deceiving	himself.	He	compares	his	relationship	to	the	young	man	in	terms	of	marriage,	except	that	this	“marriage”	is	one	of	love,	not	the	kind	of	convenient	relationship	with	a	woman	the	speaker	suggests	for	the	young	man	in	Sonnet	1	and	3.	The	speaker	becomes	like	a	willingly	deceived	spouse	who	knows	that	his	“wife”	is	untrue,	yet	he	chooses	to	ignore	the	signs	and	remain	ignorant.	He	says,	“Like	a	deceived	husband;	so	
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love’s	face	/	May	still	seem	love	to	me,	though	altered	new,	/	Thy	looks	with	me,	thy	heart	in	other	place”	(2-4).	The	possibility	of	losing	the	young	man’s	affections	keeps	the	speaker	from	confronting	the	reality	that	the	young	man	feels	something	significantly	less	than	he	does.	In	these	sonnets,	then,	Shakespeare’s	speaker	addresses	the	issue	of	friendship	not	fully	reciprocated	and	demonstrates	the	lengths	that	he	will	go	to	in	order	to	experience	some	recognition	of	affection	from	his	beloved,	regardless	how	the	youth	may	abuse	or	ignore	their	relationship.	Although	the	speaker	exonerates	the	young	man	from	any	wrongdoing,	the	young	man’s	actions	speak	to	his	self-centeredness	and	his	lack	of	affection	toward	the	speaker.		The	speaker	longs	for	a	friendship	of	mutuality,	but	the	inequity	of	age,	status,	and	love	precludes	any	possibility	for	an	idealized	friendship.			 The	imbalance	of	affection	between	male	friends	and	the	challenges	of	outside	forces	that	undermine	the	friendship,	which	he	addresses	in	his	sonnets,	Shakespeare	portrays	in	his	tragicomedy	The	Merchant	of	Venice.	Like	the	older	speaker	of	the	sonnets	who	displays	a	disproportionate	affection	for	a	young	nobleman,	Antonio,	the	merchant	of	the	play's	title,	shares	a	friendship	of	inequality	with	the	young	gentleman	Bassanio.	And	like	the	young	man	of	Shakespeare’s	sonnets,	Bassanio	exhibits	some	of	the	same	self-serving,	self-loving	tendencies.			 In	Sedgewick’s	argument,	“Swan	in	Love:	The	Example	of	Shakespeare’s	Sonnets,”	regarding	male	homosocial	bonds,	she	contends	that	male	relationships	often	configure	structurally	as	a	triangle	with	a	woman	serving	as	a	channel	in	which	the	two	men	may	express	their	male	bonds	(33).	No	love	rivalry	for	a	dark	lady	occurs	in	Merchant,	but	there	does	exist	two	triangular	structures	that	undermine	the	friendship	between	Antonio	and	Bassanio.	The	first	consists	of	Antonio,	Portia,	and	Bassanio.	Although	a	woman	does	come	
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between	the	two	friends,	the	juxtaposition	of	the	characters	differs.	Ironically,	it	is	Bassanio	who	is	the	object	of	affection	and	Portia	and	Antonio	are	rivals	for	his	love.	In	the	second	configuration,	the	female	is	excluded	entirely;	instead,	Antonio	and	Bassanio	are	linked	by	Shylock,	the	merchant’s	antagonist.	The	bond	Antonio	makes	with	the	moneylender	on	behalf	of	the	young	man	places	Shylock	in	a	position	of	power	over	Antonio	and	Bassanio,	which	threatens	their	friendship.	Though	the	calculations	of	Shylock	and	Portia	expose	the	vulnerabilities	of	Antonio	and	Bassanio’s	friendship,	it	is	the	inequities	of	their	friendship	that	weaken	their	relationship	and	prevent	them	from	experiencing	the	idealized	friendship	that	Montaigne	describes	as	“one	soul	in	bodies	twain”	(214).		 Antonio,	the	Venetian	merchant,	sets	himself	apart	from	the	other	characters	at	the	start	of	the	play	through	his	melancholy	temperament.	He	admits	to	Salerio	and	Solanio,		In	sooth,	I	know	not	why	I	am	so	sad:	It	wearies	me;	you	say	it	wearies	you;	But	how	I	caught	it,	found	it,	or	came	by	it,	What	stuff	'tis	made	of,	whereof	it	is	born,	I	am	to	learn;	And	such	a	want-wit	sadness	makes	of	me,	That	I	have	much	ado	to	know	myself.	(Merchant	1.1.1-7)		Unlike	the	two	men	who,	according	to	John	R.	Cooper,	“find	Antonio’s	melancholy	amusing”	(119),	Antonio	cannot	share	in	their	disposition.	Although	it	appears	that	Antonio	is	friendly	with	several	of	the	young	men	of	Venice,	he	stands	apart	from	them	in	age16	and	
																																																								16	Although	no	specific	age	is	given	for	Antonio,	his	monetary	wealth	and	standing	in	the	Venetian	community	suggest	that	he	is	older	than	Bassanio.	Bassanio,	on	the	other	hand,	refers	to	himself	as	a	“willful	youth”	(1.1.146).	Also,	when	Portia-as-Balthasar	asks,	“Which	is	the	merchant	here,	and	which	the	Jew?”	(4.1.172),	it	
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temperament.	Instead,	he	sees	himself	as	an	actor	playing	a	part;	he	is	the	melancholy	Jacques-like	character	who	views	life	in	terms	of	performance	as	he	tells	Gratiano,	“I	hold	the	world	but	as	the	world,	Gratiano—/	A	state	where	everyman	must	play	a	part,	/	And	mine	a	sad	one”	(1.1.77-79).	Antonio	claims	that	he	has	no	notion	of	the	origin	of	his	gloomy	temperament,	which	opens	the	issue	up	to	both	other	characters	and	scholars.			 Salerio	and	Solanio	offer	several	reasons	for	Antonio’s	sad	demeanor.	At	first	Salerio	suggests	that	Antonio	is	preoccupied	with	his	ventures	at	sea.	When	Antonio	rejects	the	idea	that	his	argosies	are	the	reason	for	his	sad	behavior,	Solanio	submits	love	is	the	cause	for	his	disposition.	Antonio’s	denial	to	Solanio	is	an	emphatic	“Fie,	fie!”	(1.1.46).	Solanio	then	proposes	that	Antonio	is	sad	for	no	particular	reason:	“Then	let	us	say	you	are	sad	/	Because	you	are	not	merry”(1.1.47-48).	The	most	telling	indication	of	Antonio’s	depression,	however,	occurs	when	Salerio	watches	Antonio	say	goodbye	to	Bassanio	when	he	leaves	for	Belmont,	and	he	describes	the	encounter	to	Solanio:	I	saw	Bassanio	and	Antonio	part.	Bassanio	told	him	he	would	make	some	speed	Of	his	return;	he	answered,	“Do	not	so.		Slubber	not	business	for	my	sake	Bassanio,	But	stay	the	very	riping	of	the	time;	And	for	the	Jew’s	bond	which	he	hath	of	me,		Let	it	not	enter	in	your	mind	of	love.	Be	merry	and	employ	your	chiefest	thoughts	To	courtship	and	such	fair	ostents	of	love																																																																																																																																																																																			implies	that	Antonio	and	Shylock	may	be	close	enough	in	age	to	merit	the	question.	Shylock,	of	course,	has	a	grown	daughter	and	Portia	describes	him	as	“old”	(4.2.11).	
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As	shall	conveniently	become	you	there.”	And	even	there,	his	eye	being	big	with	tears,	Turning	his	face,	he	put	his	hand	behind	him,	And	with	affection	wondrous	sensible	He	wrung	Bassanio’s	hand;	and	so	they	parted.	(2.8.35-49)	Antonio’s	instruction	to	Bassanio	is	reminiscent	of	the	speaker’s	advice	in	Sonnet	71	to	the	young	man.	The	unspoken	yet	unmistakable	longing	for	the	young	man	to	remember	him	after	he	is	gone	is	the	same	yearning	Antonio	apparently	has	for	Bassanio.	Thus	Antonio’s	words	and	actions	lead	many	critics	to	speculate	that	his	demeanor	stems	from	his	feelings	for	Bassanio.	Steve	Patterson,	for	example,	interprets	Antonio’s	feelings	as	lover	like:		The	merchant's	pursuit	of	Bassanio	is	wearisome	and	circular	in	a	way	reminiscent	of	Sir	Thomas	Wyatt's	exhausted	hunter	in	“Whoso	List	to	Hunt”:	like	that	frustrated	lover,	Antonio	makes	bids	for	a	love	quarry	he	cannot	touch.		It	is	as	if	noli	me	tangere	demarcates	Antonio's	object	of	desire	as	it	had	the	hunter’s	hind.	(16)	Other	critics	echo	Patterson	describing	Antonio’s	feelings	as	“a	dying	homoerotic	or	homosexual	attachment”	(Gagiano	61),	“homonormative”	(Geisweidt	10),	or	“filled	with	sexual	shame”	(Kleinberg	113).		While	Antonio’s	regard	for	Bassanio	does	seem	disproportionate	for	that	of	mere	friendship,	the	leap	from	friendship	to	would-be	lover	seems	unlikely	considering	Solanio	refers	to	Bassanio	as	Antonio’s	“most	noble	kinsman”	(Merchant	1.1.57).	Although	Harry	Berger	presents	the	notion	that	the	word	kinsman	may	serve	as	“an	overpolite	synonym	for	‘lover’”	(25),	the	Oxford	English	Dictionary	defines	
kinsman	as	“A	man	of	one’s	own	kin;	a	relative	by	blood	(or,	loosely,	by	marriage).”	Also,	
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considering	the	overwhelming	number	of	biblical	allusions	in	Merchant,	the	plausibility	that	Shakespeare	takes	the	connotation	for	the	word	kinsman	from	the	Bible—which	implies	relation	by	blood	or	marriage—seems	more	likely.17	If	this	is	the	intended	meaning	by	Solanio,	then	a	lover-like	relationship	between	the	two	men	seems	less	probable,	though	not	impossible.			 Instead,	Bassanio	himself	introduces	another	possible	scenario	for	the	men’s	bond.	Speaking	to	Antonio,	he	says,		Tis	not	unknown	to	you,	Antonio,	How	much	I	have	disabled	mine	estate	By	something	showing	a	more	swelling	port	Than	my	faint	means	would	grant	continuance.	Nor	do	I	now	make	moan	to	be	abridged		From	such	a	noble	rate;	but	my	chief	care		Is	to	come	fairly	off	from	the	great	debts		Wherein	my	time,	something	too	prodigal,	Hath	left	me	gaged.	(Merchant	1.1.122-130).		A	biblically-literate	Elizabethan	audience	would	have	understood	the	word	“prodigal”	as	an	allusion	to	the	prodigal	son	of	Luke	15:11-32.	If	Bassanio	is	identified	with	the	biblical	prodigal	son,	the	natural	position	for	Antonio	to	hold	would	be	that	of	Bassanio’s	loving	father	who,	like	the	parent	in	Luke	15,	gives	freely	of	his	money	only	to	have	his	“son”	squander	his	inheritance.	Yet	the	father	never	denies	him	love	or	money.	Antonio,	who	is	older	than	Bassanio	and	has	no	children	of	his	own,	perhaps	recognizes	that	he	is,	in	fact,																																																									17	See	Numbers	5:8,	27:11;	Ruth	2:1,	3:9,	3:12-13,	4:1	(KJV).	
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playing	a	part—the	part	of	a	loving	parent	to	a	wayward	son.	Charles	Pastoor’s	argument	reinforces	the	notion	of	Antonio	as	substitute	father:	“The	pattern	for	Antonio	is	that	of	the	father	of	the	prodigal,	who	instantly	and	without	qualification	forgives	his	wayward	son	and	restores	him	to	his	former	position	in	the	household”18	(4).			 Although	the	pattern	of	Antonio’s	behavior	may	appear	fatherlike,	descriptions	by	Solanio	and	Salerio	give	some	indication	how	other	characters	view	the	two	men’s	relationship.	As	previously	mentioned,	Solanio	calls	Bassanio	Antonio’s	“most	noble	kinsman”	(1.1.57),	and	Salerio	describes	him	as	the	“worthier	friend”	(1.1.61).	The	words	“noble”	and	“worthier”	likely	indicate	Bassanio’s	social	status,	and	“kinsmen”	and	“friend”	denote	relationship	status.	While	Solanio	and	Salerio	may	view	Bassanio	as	Antonio’s	social	better,	Solanio	supports	Antonio’s	worthiness	as	a	friend	when	he	declares,	“The	good	Antonio,	the	honest	Antonio—oh,	that	I	had	a	title	good	enough	to	keep	his	name	company”	(12-14).	While	others,	such	as	Shylock,	may	view	Antonio	in	a	less	complimentary	light,	Solanio	and	Salerio	believe	Antonio	is	Bassanio’s	worthy	friend.			 Antonio’s	earnest	regard	for	Bassanio	also	reflects	an	idealized	tradition	of	early	modern	friendship.	For	example,	the	love	Montaigne	expresses	for	his	friend	La	Boétie	mirrors	the	same	kind	of	devotion	Antonio	conveys	to	Bassanio:	“For	the	perfect	friendship	which	I	am	talking	about	is	indivisible:	each	gives	himself	so	entirely	to	his	friend	that	he	has	nothing	left	to	share	with	another:	on	the	contrary,	he	grieves	that	he	is	not	two-fold,	three-fold	or	four-fold	and	that	he	does	not	have	several	souls,	several	wills,	so	that	he	could	give	them	all	to	the	one	he	loves”	(215).	By	his	actions	toward	Bassanio,	Antonio	appears	to	long	for	this	kind	of	perfect	amity	and	acts	toward	his	friend	accordingly.																																																									18	Susan	McLean	also	notes	that	Antonio	“is	identified	more	closely	with	the	father	of	the	parable”	(49).	
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Therefore,	there	are	several	possible	explanations	for	Antonio’s	melancholy:	he	is	saddened	by	Bassanio’s	frivolous	living,	he	is	afraid	he	might	lose	Bassanio’s	friendship,	and/or	he	is	“grieved”	that	he	cannot	do	more	for	his	friend.	Regardless	of	the	exact	characterization	of	Antonio	and	Bassanio’s	relationship,	one	thing	is	clear:	Antonio’s	feelings	of	friendship	for	Bassanio	run	deep.		 Because	he	is	a	merchant,	Antonio	expresses	his	feelings	of	amity	toward	Bassanio	in	economic	gestures.	He	gives	without	reservation,	and	Bassanio’s	extravagant	living	makes	him	rely	heavily	upon	Antonio’s	generosity.	Antonio	tells	Bassanio,	“My	purse,	my	person,	my	extremest	means	/	Lie	all	unlocked	to	your	occasions”	(1.1.138-139).	Bassanio	in	turn	readily	acknowledges	his	fiscal	failings,	but	unlike	the	prodigal	son	of	the	New	Testament,	he	shows	little	to	no	remorse	for	his	actions.	Instead,	he	envisions	a	way	to	pay	back	his	debts	by	risking	more	of	Antonio’s	money	in	an	attempt	to	attain	Portia,	a	rich	woman	who	is	bound	by	her	father’s	will	in	order	to	marry.	Bassanio	knows	from	past	experience	that	his	friend	will	not	deny	him.	Using	the	metaphor	of	an	arrow,	he	entreats	Antonio	to	fund	this	venture:	I	owe	you	much,	and,	like	a	willful	youth	That	which	I	owe	is	lost;	but	if	you	please		To	shoot	another	arrow	that	self	way	As	I	will	watch	the	aim,	or	to	find	both		Or	bring	your	latter	hazard	back	again	And	thankfully	rest	debtor	for	the	first.	(1.1.147-152)	Bassanio	also	considers	his	relationship	with	Antonio	in	financial	terms.	He	knows	that	Antonio	values	their	friendship,	and	he	uses	that	information	to	his	advantage.	In	“Love	and	
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Friendship	in	The	Merchant	of	Venice”	John	D.	Hurrell	contends	that	Bassanio	is	aware	of	the	“great	disparity	in	the	degree	of	friendship	between	them”	(334)	and	attempts	to	“misrepresent	his	motives”	(334)	by	reinforcing	the	idea	that	he	wishes	to	marry	in	order	to	pay	his	debts	to	Antonio.	This	way,	Bassanio	gives	Antonio	the	impression	that	he	means	more	to	him	than	Portia	and	her	fortune.	At	this	point,	even	though	Bassanio	regards	Antonio	as	a	friend,	his	depth	of	feeling	towards	the	merchant	remains	suspect.	His	selfish	motivations	prompt	him	to	accept	Antonio’s	generosity.			 While	critics	such	as	Gagiano	see	Antonio	and	Bassanio’s	friendship	as	“mercenary”	(65)	and	Antonio’s	generosity	toward	Bassanio	as	nothing	more	than	a	feeble	attempt	to	keep	Bassanio	indebted	to	him,	according	to	Unhae	Lagis,	Antonio’s	largess	stems	from	his	purity	of	friendship,		Unlike	the	friendship	of	utility,	this	finest	kind	of	friendship	to	which	Antonio	aspires	with	regard	to	Bassanio	is	grounded	in	gift	exchange:	actions	and	objects	freely	rendered	upon	a	friend	solely	for	his	benefit.	According	to	Seneca’s	De	Beneficiis...the	gift	exchange	of	virtuous	friendship	involves	a	spiritual	usury,	spawning	an	infinite	cycle	of	benefits	directed	toward	the	other.	(20)	While	he	may	not	be	completely	aware	of	his	motives,	Antonio	no	doubt	loves	Bassanio	if	only	because	he	willingly	risks	his	fortune	and	his	life	for	him.	To	see	Antonio	as	a	pathetic	character	grasping	for	Bassanio’s	love	and	attention	devalues	the	amity	he	feels.	He	may	have	feelings	of	jealousy	towards	Bassanio’s	new	love	interest,	but	that	does	not	negate	his	desire	to	see	Bassanio	happy.		
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	 The	idea	of	gift	reciprocity,	however,	does	not	extend	to	Bassanio.	His	wish	to	repay	his	debt	to	the	merchant	does	not	constitute	a	gift	exchange;	instead,	it	is	designed	to	give	him	freedom	from	his	financial	obligation	to	Antonio.	According	to	Jan	Lawson	Hinely,	“Bassanio’s	ties	to	Antonio	have	been	financial	as	well	as	emotional,	and	the	winning	of	the	wealthy	Portia	will	not	only	provide	a	competing	emotional	bond,	it	will	also	remove	this	reassuringly	tangible	financial	dependence.	The	friendship	will	then	be	forced	to	endure	on	emotional	strength	alone”	(232).	Since	Bassanio’s	attachment	to	Antonio	does	not	equal	that	of	his	friend’s,	the	lack	of	emotional	reciprocity	jeopardizes	their	tenuous	bond	of	friendship.		 According	to	Aristotle’s	Nicomachean	Ethics	(which	is	the	basis	for	much	of	the	early	modern	writings	of	friendship)19	Antonio	and	Bassanio’s	friendship	must	develop	a	form	of	equality	in	order	to	survive:	In	all	friendships	implying	inequality	the	love	also	should	be	proportional,	i.e.	the	better	should	be	more	loved	than	he	loves,	and	so	should	the	more	useful,	and	similarly	in	each	of	the	other	cases;	for	when	the	love	is	in	proportion	to	the	merit	of	the	parties,	then	in	a	sense	arises	equality,	which	is	certainly	held	to	be	characteristic	of	friendship.	(150)	If	Aristotle	is	correct,	their	friendship	cannot	survive	because	Antonio,	being	the	“better”	and	“the	more	useful”	in	terms	of	his	love	and	generosity	toward	Bassanio	should	be	loved	by	his	friend	more	than	he	loves.	Yet	that	contradicts	the	foundation	of	their	friendship.	It	is	Antonio	who	demonstrates	that	his	love	far	exceeds	anything	Bassanio	feels	for	him.	Bassanio,	on	the	other	hand,	displays	no	form	of	affection	for	his	friend	except	when	he																																																									19	See	(Stretter	347-348)	and	(Turner	416).	
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believes	Antonio’s	life	is	in	jeopardy.	In	Act	4	he	offers	Shylock	a	generous	six	thousand	ducats	for	Antonio’s	life,	but	the	gift	does	not	come	with	the	same	sacrifice	as	Antonio’s	since	it	is	Portia	who	offers	to	pay	his	friend’s	debt.	Bassanio	is	merely	the	emissary	for	Portia’s	generosity,	which	she	does	for	his	sake.	She	tells	Bassanio,	“Double	six	thousand,	and	then	treble	that,	/	Before	a	friend	of	this	description	/	Shall	lose	a	hair	through	Bassanio’s	fault”	(3.3.300-302).	Her	generosity	stems	from	her	wish	that	Bassanio	will	not	feel	any	guilt	for	his	friend’s	predicament.	Even	though	he	wants	to	save	Antonio,	Bassanio	sacrifices	little	for	his	friend.		 Bassanio’s	relationship	to	Antonio	more	closely	resembles	one	of	Aristotle’s	three	kinds	of	friendship,	which	includes	friendship	for	good,	friendship	for	utility,	and	friendship	for	pleasure	(144).	Bassanio’s	relationship	with	Antonio	shows	signs	of	a	friendship	of	utility.	According	to	the	philosopher,	friendships	of	utility	and	pleasure	are	based	on	self-interest.20	When	the	usefulness	or	the	pleasure	no	longer	exists	for	these	flawed	friendships,	they	eventually	wane	since	their	foundations	cannot	bear	the	weight	of	change.	Hence,	if	Bassanio’s	friendship	is	based	solely	on	his	need	for	Antonio’s	fortune,	their	friendship	will	most	likely	fail.		 Although	Antonio	agrees	to	help	Bassanio	in	his	pursuit	of	Portia,	Bassanio’s	opportunity	to	win	Portia	and	obtain	financial	freedom	lies	in	the	hands	of	Shylock,	the	Jewish	moneylender.	Because	his	fortune	is	tied	to	his	argosies	at	sea,	Antonio	has	neither	“money	nor	commodity	/	To	raise	a	present	sum”	(1.1.178-79);	therefore,	he	urges	
																																																								20	“Therefore	those	who	love	because	of	utility	love	because	of	what	is	good	for	themselves,	and	those	who	love	because	of	pleasure	do	so	because	of	what	is	pleasant	to	themselves,	and	not	because	of	who	the	loved	person	is	but	in	so	far	as	he	is	useful	or	pleasant.	And	thus	these	friendships	are	only	incidental;	for	it	is	not	as	being	the	man	he	is	that	the	loved	person	is	loved,	but	as	providing	some	good	or	pleasure”	(Aristotle	144).		
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Bassanio	to	find	a	moneylender	with	whom	Antonio’s	name	will	carry	weight.	Unfortunately	for	Antonio,	Bassanio	finds	Shylock,	a	man	who	is	the	antithesis	of	prodigality	and	has	no	love	for	Antonio;	indeed,	he	agrees	to	fund	Bassanio	for	three	thousand	ducats	merely	for	vengeful	reasons.	He	negotiates	a	contract	with	him	and	stipulates	Antonio’s	flesh	as	collateral.	Before	Antonio	accepts	the	terms,	however,	Shylock	verbalizes	his	intentions	toward	the	merchant:	How	like	a	fawning	publican	he	looks!	I	hate	him	for	he	is	a	Christian,	But	more	for	that	in	low	simplicity	He	lends	out	money	gratis	and	brings	down	The	rate	of	usance	here	with	us	in	Venice.		If	I	can	catch	him	once	upon	the	hip,	I	will	feed	fat	the	ancient	grudge	I	bear	him.	(1.3.38-44)	Even	though	his	expression	“feed	fat”	refers	to	his	longstanding	bitterness	toward	Antonio,	Shylock’s	language	evokes	the	imagery	of	a	sacrificial	lamb	that	is	being	fattened	for	the	slaughter.	This	sacrificial	animal	imagery	is	reinforced	in	Act	4	by	Antonio’s	submission	to	the	forfeiture	of	his	bond	when	he	says,	“I	am	tainted	wether	of	the	flock	/	Meetest	for	death”	(4.1.114-115).	In	terms	of	friendship,	Joan	Ozark	Holmer	contends,	“The	sheep	metaphor	also	appropriately	describes	Antonio	who,	for	love	of	his	friend,	can	be	seen	as	a	type	of	sacrificial	lamb	to	Shylock’s	hatred”	(310).	Likewise,	Paul	A.	Cantor	describes	Antonio’s	willingness	to	prove	his	love	to	Bassanio	as	a	kind	of	“martyr	complex”	(248).	Yet	Antonio’s	lighthearted	response	in	Act	1—“Content,	in	faith.	I’ll	seal	to	such	a	bond	/	and	
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say	there	is	much	kindness	in	the	Jew”	(1.3.151-152)—towards	Shylock’s	contractual	terms	directly	contradicts	his	sacrificial	words	and	actions	later	in	the	play.			 Ironically,	although	Antonio	is	eventually	laid	upon	Shylock’s	altar	of	revenge,	it	is	the	friendship	between	Antonio	and	Bassanio	that	is	sacrificed.	Because	of	his	love	for	the	young	man,	Antonio	offers	his	body	as	security	to	Shylock.	Even	though	Bassanio	tells	his	friend,	“You	shall	not	seal	to	such	a	bond	for	me!	/	I’d	rather	dwell	in	my	necessity	(1.3.153-154),	his	concern	for	Antonio	appears	contrived	since	he	eventually	agrees	to	let	Antonio	risk	his	life	for	his	scheme	regarding	Portia.	In	“The	Rival	Lovers	in	The	Merchant	of	Venice,”	Lawrence	W.	Hyman	claims,		To	him	[Bassanio]	the	friendship	is	best	represented	by	a	monetary	loan	which	could	be	easily	repaid	with	the	money	he	would	gain	by	marrying	Portia.	But	to	Antonio	the	link	between	the	money	that	could	be	returned	and	the	feeling	‘nearest	his	heart’	(that	unfortunately	could	not	be	returned	by	Bassanio)	is	not	so	clearly	separated.	(111)	Antonio	equates	love	and	friendship	with	gift	giving.	He	sees	that	Bassanio	has	a	need,	and	he	wishes	to	fulfill	it.	In	contrast,	Bassanio’s	self-interest	proves	greater	than	his	friendship	for	Antonio.	Although	it	may	be	Shylock’s	vindictive	terms	of	his	bond	with	Antonio	that	exposes	the	fractured	foundation	of	Antonio	and	Bassanio’s	friendship,	it	is	Bassanio’s	indifference	toward	his	friend’s	welfare	that	has	compromised	the	foundation	of	their	relationship	from	the	beginning.		 Though	Shylock’s	vengeful	speech	regarding	Antonio	indicates	monetary	greed	and	religious	hatred,	his	animosity	does	not	occur	without	provocation.	Antonio’s	aggressive	behavior	towards	Shylock’s	usury	in	terms	of	his	Christianity	proves	severe	when	no	other	
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Christian	in	Venice	appears	troubled	enough	by	his	moneylending	practices	to	abuse	him	physically.	Yet	for	all	of	Antonio’s	righteous	outrage	over	Shylock’s	business,	he	readily	abandons	his	own	religious	convictions	for	Bassanio’s	sake	and	consents	to	Shylock’s	terms.	He	tells	the	moneylender,	“Shylock,	albeit	I	neither	lend	nor	borrow	/	By	taking	nor	giving	of	excess,	/	Yet,	to	supply	the	ripe	wants	of	my	friend,	/	I’ll	break	my	custom”	(1.3.58-61).	Antonio’s	love	for	Bassanio	borders	on	idolatry	when	he	places	Bassanio’s	wants	above	his	own	Christian	principles.	Like	the	speaker	in	Sonnet	35,	he	willingly	corrupts	himself	for	the	sake	of	the	young	man.	To	soothe	his	own	conscience,	Antonio	tells	Shylock	to	regard	him	as	his	“enemy”	(1.3.133)	rather	than	his	friend,	for	as	Deuteronomy	23:20a	commands,	“Unto	a	stranger	thou	mayest	lend	upon	usury;	but	unto	thy	brother	thou	shalt	not	lend	upon	usury”	(KJV).	Antonio	recognizes	that	his	agreement	with	Shylock	betrays	his	beliefs,	yet	his	excessive	devotion	for	Bassanio	proves	stronger	than	his	convictions,	and	he	freely	offers	his	body—a	much	more	excessive	form	of	“interest”—to	Shylock	for	Bassanio’s	sake.		 Antonio’s	generosity	and	devotion	only	magnify	Bassanio’s	selfish	tendencies	and	his	attitude	toward	their	friendship.	He	willingly	gambles	Antonio’s	life	and	livelihood	and	his	own	posterity	to	regain	his	wealth	by	attempting	to	win	Portia’s	hand	in	marriage	through	a	game	of	chance.	Like	Petruchio	who	wishes	to	“wive	it	wealthily	in	Padua”	(The	
Taming	of	the	Shrew	1.2.75),	Bassanio’s	monetary	reasons	for	marring	Portia	reveal	his	gold-digging	propensities.	Though	he	maintains	that	Portia	is	“fair	and,	fairer	than	that	word	of	wondrous	virtues”	(1.1.162-163),	his	first	description	of	her	is	“a	lady	richly	left”	(1.1.161).	His	initial	inclination	toward	Portia	is	not	one	of	love	but	of	the	necessity	to	pay	
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his	debts	and	maintain	his	lavish	lifestyle.	Bassanio	will	soon	trade	one	financial	backer—Antonio—for	another—Portia.			 Bassanio	gives	Antonio	the	impression	that	Portia	means	little	to	him	except	as	a	way	to	recoup	his	losses,	yet	soon	after	arriving	at	Belmont,	he	hastily	declares	his	love	to	her.	Gagiano	remarks	on	Bassanio’s	apathy	towards	his	friendship	with	Antonio	and	his	willingness	to	make	Portia	his	new	benefactor:	“Bassanio’s	easy	and	predatory	transference	of	‘affections’	to	Portia	shows	in	the	way	he	‘sells’	his	project	to	Antonio”	(66).	Though	his	declaration	of	love	may	indicate	his	financial	reasons	for	marrying	have	altered,	his	mercenary	purpose	for	seeking	Portia’s	hand	remains.	Until	now	he	has	depended	on	Antonio	for	his	means	of	support,	but	when	he	chooses	the	lead	casket	and	finds	within	it	Portia’s	portrait,	Bassanio	exchanges	his	friendship	of	economy	with	Antonio	for	a	marriage	of	economy	with	Portia.	He	happily	relinquishes	his	debt	to	Portia;	she	dissolves	his	monetary	obligation	to	Antonio	and	becomes	his	only	means	of	support.			 Bassanio’s	acknowledgment	of	Antonio’s	love	and	friendship	comes	when	news	of	Antonio’s	forfeiture	of	his	bond	reaches	them.	He	realizes	the	extent	to	which	Antonio	has	sacrificed	for	their	friendship	and	the	extent	to	which	he	has	exploited	it.	Only	after	Antonio’s	letter	arrives	does	Bassanio	reveal	to	Portia	the	nature	of	his	relationship	with	the	merchant.	His	earlier	declarations	of	his	poverty	pale	in	comparison	to	what	he	really	owes	his	friend.	He	tells	her,	Rating	myself	at	nothing,	you	shall	see	How	much	I	was	a	braggart.	When	I	told	you		My	state	was	nothing,	I	should	then	have	told	you		That	I	was	worse	than	nothing;	for	indeed		
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I	have	engaged	myself	to	a	dear	friend,	To	feed	my	means.	(Merchant	3.2.257-263)	At	this	point,	Bassanio	feels	the	great	weight	of	his	debt	to	Antonio.	He	shows	to	Portia	how	inept	he	is	at	finances	and	frugality.		He	also	attempts	to	describe	to	Portia	what	kind	of	man	Antonio	is:		The	dearest	friend	to	me,	the	kindest	man,		The	best-conditioned	and	unwearied	spirit		In	doing	courtesies,	and	one	in	whom	The	ancient	Roman	honor	more	appears		Than	any	that	draws	breath	in	Italy.	(3.2.292-296)		Even	when	Bassanio	attempts	to	declare	his	friendship	with	Antonio,	he	continues	to	see	him	in	terms	of	economy.	The	“courtesies”	that	Antonio	has	shown	to	him	comprise	the	merchant’s	gift	giving.	He	does,	however,	recognize	that	the	merchant’s	actions	toward	him	are	a	result	of	his	love	and	amity.	He	perceives	no	other	ulterior	motive	from	Antonio.		 In	response	to	Bassanio’s	announcement,	Portia	willingly	offers	to	pay	more	than	what	Antonio	owes.	Although	generous,	her	motives	for	erasing	Antonio’s	debt	may	be	less	than	altruistic.	By	absolving	Bassanio	of	his	culpability	in	regards	to	Antonio’s	predicament,	she	not	only	gains	Bassanio’s	gratitude	but	also	usurps	Antonio’s	position	as	benefactor.	This	is	why	she	insists	that	they	marry	before	he	leaves	for	Venice.	In	this	way	the	money	Bassanio	intends	to	use	to	clear	Antonio’s	debt	will	belong	to	him;	he	will	be	his	own	master	and	no	longer	need	to	depend	on	Antonio’s	generosity.	Portia	has	eliminated	his	monetary	obligation	and	contracted	her	own	bond	with	Bassanio,	a	bond	of	marriage;	
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however,	the	bond	must	be	fulfilled	for	it	to	be	binding.	Martin	D.	Yaffe	argues	concerning	Portia	and	Bassanio’s	marriage,		Antonio’s	shadow	hangs	over	the	newlywed’s	marriage,	as	it	has	over	their	courtship.	There	it	will	hover	till	the	play’s	final	scene.	As	his	charitable	contribution	to	Bassanio’s	prodigality	has	delayed	the	consummation	of	their	courtship,	though	ultimately	it	furthers	it,	so	too	it	will	delay	the	consummation	of	their	marriage	bond.	Everything,	as	it	were,	awaits	Antonio’s	fate.	(60)	As	mentioned	previously,	Portia’s	benevolence	comes	out	of	love	for	Bassanio	and	not	genuine	concern	for	Antonio;	until	the	letter,	she	was	unaware	of	Antonio’s	existence.	But	her	intrusion	into	Antonio	and	Bassanio’s	relationship	eventually	widens	the	gap	of	inequity	between	the	two	friends.	She	restores	Bassanio’s	place	in	society	by	replenishing	his	fortune.	He	is	no	longer	the	nobleman	beggar.	He	is	capable	of	breaking	the	mercantile	bonds	that	hold	together	his	friendship	with	Antonio.	Furthermore,	by	offering	to	pay	the	merchant’s	debt,	Portia	transfers	Bassanio’s	obligation	from	Antonio	to	herself.	Antonio	too	will	be	in	her	debt;	consequently,	he	will	be	forced	to	respect	their	marriage	bond.		 The	letter	that	Antonio	sends	Bassanio	is	more	than	an	announcement	of	his	circumstances;	it	is	an	entreaty	by	the	older	man	for	the	young	man’s	recognition	of	their	friendship:		 Sweet	Bassanio,	my	ships	have	all	miscarried,	my	creditors	grow	cruel,	my	estate	is	very	low,	my	bond	to	the	Jew	is	forfeit;	and	since	in	paying	it,	it	is	impossible	I	should	live,	all	debts	are	cleared	between	you	and	I	if	I	might	but	
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see	you	at	my	death.	Notwithstanding,	use	your	pleasure.	If	your	love	do	not	persuade	you	to	come,	let	not	my	letter.	(3.2.315-322)	Again	Antonio’s	plea	closely	resembles	that	of	the	older	speaker	in	Sonnet	71	when	he	urges	the	young	man	not	to	mourn	him	when	he	is	dead,	while	at	the	same	time	yearning	for	any	hint	of	the	young	man’s	love.	Antonio	catalogues	the	terrible	circumstances	of	his	situation	in	his	letter	to	Bassanio,	clearly	hoping	he	can	compel	the	young	man	to	his	side.	Until	now,	Antonio	has	not	been	certain	that	Bassanio	feels	any	real	amity	toward	him.	He	knows	that	his	financial	assistance	is	the	foundation	of	their	friendship.	The	only	proof	that	Antonio	has	regarding	Bassanio’s	love	for	him	is	his	presence	at	the	trial.	Regarding	Antonio’s	request	Hyman	notes,	“What	may	seem	desperate	or	effeminate	devices	to	ensnare	a	man	are	heroic	actions	in	the	friendship	tradition.	Antonio	wants	Bassanio	to	be	present	at	his	trial	as	a	sign	of	their	love,	perhaps	in	hopes	of	having	his	friendship,	like	the	amity	between	Elyot’s	twins,	‘througout	the	city	published,	extolled,	and	magnified’”	(23).		While	he	does	wish	for	Bassanio	to	prove	his	love	to	him	by	being	present,	Antonio	does	not	want	to	force	Bassanio	to	come;	he	desires	that	the	young	man’s	actions	come	as	result	of	his	feelings	for	him.	Antonio	demonstrates	his	altruism	by	cancelling	the	debt	Bassanio	owes	him	even	if	Bassanio	does	not	comply	with	his	wishes.	Nevertheless,	by	absolving	the	debt,	Antonio	manages	to	undermine	his	self-sacrifice.	If	he	dies	without	Bassanio	seeing	him,	Bassanio	will	forever	have	to	mourn	Antonio	for	his	blame	in	the	merchant’s	demise.			 The	two	triangular	relationships	merge	during	Antonio’s	trial	in	which	Shylock	demands	that	the	court	grant	him	his	bond.	Jointly,	Shylock’s	intrusion	with	the	bond	and	Portia’s	intervention	at	court	help	reveal	the	inconsistencies	of	Antonio	and	Bassanio’s	friendship.	Initially,	it	appears	that	Shylock’s	demand	brings	the	two	men	closer	together	
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by	making	Bassanio	verbally	express	to	Portia	his	love	for	Antonio.	His	declaration,	however,	prompts	Portia	to	disguise	herself	as	a	young	doctor	of	law	to	save	Antonio	from	Shylock’s	revenge.	It	must	be	she	and	no	other	judge	who	saves	Antonio	from	certain	death	since	her	actions	eventually	lead	to	both	men	owing	her	a	debt	they	cannot	repay.	She	breaks	the	financial	bond	Bassanio	has	with	Antonio	so	that	Bassanio	is	free	from	any	guilt	caused	by	his	actions	for	Antonio’s	plight.		 In	order	for	Portia	to	become	Antonio’s	savior,	she	must	render	Shylock’s	bond	worthless.	As	the	young	judge	Balthasar,	she	begins	her	examination	of	the	witnesses	by	beginning	with	the	question,	“Which	is	the	merchant	here,	and	which	the	Jew?”	(4.1.172).	For	her,	both	men	represent	the	same	obstacle	that	she	must	overcome	in	order	to	live	with	Bassanio	as	a	true	husband	and	wife.	Her	annihilation	of	Shylock	does	not	represent	her	primary	objective,	yet	he	becomes	collateral	damage	in	her	strategy	to	loosen	the	bond	of	friendship	between	Antonio	and	Bassanio.			 When	Shylock	refuses	Portia’s	last	plea	for	mercy	for	Antonio,	she	asks	the	merchant	if	he	has	anything	to	say.	Instead	of	speaking	to	the	general	assembly,	Antonio	speaks	directly	to	Bassanio.	He	says,		Commend	me	to	your	honorable	wife.		Tell	her	the	process	of	Antonio’s	end,	Say	how	I	loved	you,	speak	me	fair	in	death;		And,	when	the	tale	is	told,	bid	her	be	judge	Whether	Bassanio	had	not	once	a	love.	(4.1.271-275)	Antonio’s	impassioned	speech	indicates	his	willingness	to	sacrifice	himself	for	his	friend,	but	it	also	implies	that	his	love	is	the	only	real	love	Bassanio	may	ever	possess.	It	is	
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significant	that	Antonio	specifically	asks	Bassanio	to	relate	his	words	to	Portia.	His	sacrifice,	he	hopes,	will	prove	to	Bassanio	that	his	love	as	his	friend	exceeds	that	of	husband	and	wife.	At	the	point	of	death,	Antonio	demonstrates	his	unwillingness	to	surrender	Bassanio	completely	to	Portia.	Instead,	he	wants	to	be	remembered	as	the	person	who	loved	Bassanio	best.			 Antonio’s	view	of	friendship	closely	resembles	that	of	Montaigne’s	opinion	regarding	a	woman’s	ability	to	maintain	a	lasting	bond	with	a	man:	“Women	are	in	truth	not	normally	capable	of	responding	to	such	familiarity	and	confidence	as	sustain	that	holy	bond	of	friendship,	nor	do	their	souls	seem	firm	enough	to	withstand	the	clasp	of	a	knot	so	lasting	and	so	tightly	drawn”	(210).	Antonio	knows	Bassanio’s	initial	mercenary	motive	for	marrying	Portia,	regardless	of	what	might	have	transpired	between	the	couple	after	the	fact.	His	request	for	Bassanio	to	praise	him	to	his	wife	declares	to	her	and	the	rest	of	the	court	how	much	he	has	sacrificed	for	their	friendship.	Contrary	to	his	previous	requests	that	Bassanio	be	under	no	obligation	to	him,	here	Antonio	wishes	for	his	friend	to	remember	him	after	death.	He	is	proclaiming	to	Portia	that	her	love	can	never	exceed	his,	and	he	is	attempting	to	exemplify	for	her	the	way	in	which	she	should	love	Bassanio.	Regardless	of	his	motives,	Antonio	makes	it	evident	to	both	Bassanio	and	Portia	that	he	has	made	the	ultimate	sacrifice.	His	actions	represent	the	love	of	a	friend	as	measured	in	John	15:13,	“Greater	love	hath	no	man	than	this,	that	a	man	lay	down	his	life	for	his	friends”	(KJV).			 Bassanio’s	reaction	to	his	friend’s	words	seals	both	the	fate	of	Shylock	and	Antonio.	He	declares	to	Antonio	and	everyone	else	in	the	courtroom:		Antonio,	I	am	married	to	a	wife,		
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Which	is	as	dear	to	me	as	life	itself;		But	life	itself,	my	wife,	and	all	the	world	Are	not	with	me	esteemed	above	thy	life.	I	would	lose	all,	ay,	sacrifice	them	all		Here	to	this	devil,	to	deliver	you.	(Merchant	4.1.280-285)	Bassanio’s	zealous	words	prove	to	Portia	that	he	has	yet	to	appreciate	fully	the	relationship	between	man	and	wife.	While	he	offers	his	life,	his	wife’s,	and	everyone	else’s	in	order	to	save	his	friend,	Bassanio	once	again	displays	his	recklessness	by	offering	individuals	in	addition	to	himself	for	the	life	of	Antonio.	His	offer,	while	heartfelt,	holds	no	real	value	since	he	cannot	sacrifice	himself	or	anyone	else	to	save	his	friend.	Portia	must	sever	the	bonds	between	the	two	men	if	she	ever	hopes	to	achieve	the	marriage	she	desires.	She	accomplishes	this	by	prolonging	the	outcome	of	the	trial	and	preventing	Antonio	from	becoming	the	sacrificial	lamb.	By	allowing	Antonio	to	reach	the	point	of	death,	she	solidifies	her	position	as	savior	to	both	Antonio	and	Bassanio.	She	has	already	saved	her	husband	from	certain	financial	ruin;	now	she	saves	his	friend	from	certain	death.	At	the	precise	moment	before	Antonio	is	to	be	flayed	alive,	she	invalidates	Shylock’s	bond,	thus	conquering	the	moneylender’s	position	of	power	over	Bassanio	and	Antonio.			 In	her	final	calculation	to	make	Bassanio	comprehend	the	significance	of	his	marriage	bond,	Portia	uses	the	ring	she	gave	Bassanio	as	a	wedding	gift.	Her	plan	will	ultimately	break	the	friendship	bond	between	Antonio	and	Bassanio.	When	Bassanio	offers	Portia-as-Balthasar	the	three	thousand	ducats	for	services	rendered,	her	refusal	prompts	him	to	offer	some	“remembrance”	(4.1.420).	Since	Bassanio	verbally	acknowledged	in	court	that	Antonio	means	more	to	him	than	his	wife,	Portia	seizes	the	opportunity	to	test	
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Bassanio’s	loyalty	and	educate	him	that	his	marriage	must	have	precedence	over	his	friendship.	When	Portia	asks	Bassanio	for	his	wedding	ring,	he	refuses	the	request,	but	it	is	Antonio	who	urges	him	to	concede	to	the	young	lawyer’s	wish.	He	says,	“My	lord	Bassanio,	let	him	have	the	ring.	/	Let	his	deservings	and	my	love	withal/Be	valued	‘gainst	your	wife’s	commandment”	(4.1.447-449).	Antonio	shows	little	respect	for	Bassanio’s	marriage	vows.	He	speaks	of	the	ring	and	Portia’s	“commandment”	as	a	mere	trifle	in	comparison	to	the	deed	that	Balthasar	performed	in	saving	his	life.	By	encouraging	Bassanio	to	break	his	vow,	Antonio	becomes	complicit	in	Bassanio’s	disloyalty	to	Portia.		 The	conclusion	to	Portia’s	plan	to	subordinate	Antonio	and	Bassanio’s	friendship	to	her	marriage	happens	after	everyone	returns	to	Belmont.	Portia	and	Nerissa	challenge	their	husbands	about	their	missing	wedding	rings.	When	Bassanio	confesses	to	giving	away	the	ring	and	begins	to	swear	once	again	his	fidelity	to	her,	Portia	stops	him	with	her	words,			 	 	 Mark	you	but	that!	In	both	my	eyes	he	doubly	sees	himself;	In	each	eye,	one.	Swear	by	your	double	self,	And	there’s	an	oath	of	credit.	(5.1.243-346)	Antonio	also	admits	his	part	in	Bassanio’s	actions	and	swears	to	her,	“My	soul	upon	the	forfeit,	that	your	lord	/	Will	nevermore	break	faith	advisedly”	(5.1.252-253).	Antonio	again	promises	himself	as	collateral	for	Bassanio’s	sake.	When	Portia	hands	him	the	ring	to	give	back	to	Bassanio,	Antonio	relinquishes	his	position	of	power	over	to	Portia.	He	realizes	that	his	friendship	cannot	withstand	the	marriage	bond	since	it	is	based	mostly	on	money,	and	Bassanio	no	longer	needs	his.		
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	 Like	Petruchio,	Portia	has	tamed	Bassanio,	at	least	for	the	moment,	to	eschew	his	prodigal	ways	and	embrace	his	new	role	as	husband.	As	a	good	Christian	husband,	it	is	Bassanio’s	duty	to	leave	Antonio,	his	surrogate	“father”	and,	“cleave	unto	his	wife:	and	they	shall	be	one	flesh”	(Genesis	2:24	KJV).	While	Antonio	is	present	at	the	play’s	end,	his	lack	of	usefulness	places	him	outside	the	sphere	of	participation;	he	remains	the	only	one	not	satisfactorily	matched.	The	merchant	has	served	his	purpose	as	Bassanio’s	benefactor,	and	Portia	has	taken	his	place.	The	insurmountable	inequities	of	Antonio	and	Bassanio’s	relationship	dash	any	hope	Antonio	had	for	a	perfect	friendship.	This	leaves	the	merchant	once	again	the	solitary	figure	of	the	play.			 Like	the	complicated	relationship	exhibited	between	two	unlikely	friends	in	the	sonnets,	Shakespeare’s	The	Merchant	of	Venice	explores	the	friendship	between	two	improbable	friends	and	the	challenges	that	undermine	their	relationship.	He	demonstrates	that	the	early	modern	idealistic	qualities	of	equality	and	virtue,	that	writers	such	as	Aristotle	and	Cicero	insist	is	needed	for	a	meaningful	friendship,	have	merit.	Although	Antonio	proves	his	amity	and	loyalty	to	Bassanio	many	times	over,	the	young	man’s	selfishness	keeps	him	from	ever	having	a	meaningful	connection	with	the	merchant.	It	is	not	the	inequality	of	age	and	social	status	that	ultimately	damage	their	relationship;	it	is	the	inequity	of	their	commitments	that	keep	them	from	experiencing	a	friendship	such	as	Montaigne	describes.	Consequently,	when	outside	forces	such	as	Shylock	and	Portia	put	pressure	on	their	relationship,	it	merely	exposes	the	gap	of	inequity	that	exists	already	between	the	two	men.	Their	friendship,	at	least	on	Bassanio’s	part,	is	one	of	utility;	therefore,	since	Bassanio	no	longer	needs	Antonio,	the	friendship,	as	Aristotle	argues,	cannot	survive.	
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CHAPTER	2	
	 False	Friends:	Betrayal	of	Friendship	in	Othello,	the	Moor	of	Venice		 As	noted	in	the	introduction,	the	concept	of	friendship	for	the	early	modern	period	was	defined	in	various	ways	by	different	sources.	Tom	MacFaul	asserts	in	Male	Friendship	
in	Shakespeare	and	his	Contemporaries	that	humanism	shaped	the	concept	of	friendship	during	the	early	modern	period,	which	ultimately	took	much	of	its	ideology	from	the	classical	writer	Cicero	(7)21.	In	Laelius:	or	a	discourse	upon	friendship,	Cicero	deems	virtue	to	be	an	essential	component	of	friendship	(11).	Robert	Stretter,	on	the	other	hand,	maintains	that	Aristotle	afforded	inspiration	for	early	modern	writers	in	his	Nicomachean	
Ethics	(347-348),	which	comparable	to	Cicero	states	that	true	friendship	exists	between	“men	who	are	good,	and	alike	in	virtue”	(Aristotle	145).	Furthermore,	relationships	of	amity	explored	by	Renaissance	writers	such	as	Michel	de	Montaigne	considered	only	male	bonds	of	friendship	which,	according	to	Eve	Kosofsky	Sedgwick,	were	the	only	friendships	male	writers	considered	“stable”	(45)	as	opposed	to	the	“volatile”	(45)	bonds	that	existed	between	men	and	women.		Montaigne’s	writings	reinforce	Sedgwick’s	claim:	“Women	are	in	truth	not	normally	capable	of	responding	to	such	familiarity	and	mutual	confidence	as	sustain	that	holy	bond	of	friendship”	(210).		Montaigne	views	the	perfect	male	friendship	as	spiritually	interdependent	or	as	he	terms	it,	“One	soul	in	bodies	twain”	(214).	Consequently,	the	idealized	qualities	for	the	early	modern	male	friendship	included	virtue,	equality,	symbiosis,	and	stability.			 MacFaul	contends,	however,	that	these	ideals	were	unrealistic	and	by	Shakespeare’s	time	were	“on	the	wane”	(1)	and	“becoming	increasingly	untrustworthy”	(1).	Francis																																																									21	John	Cox	also	notes,	“Cicero’s	treatise	on	friendship	became	one	of	the	earliest	affirmations	of	humanism	in	English”	(2).	
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Bacon’s	essay	“Of	Followers	and	Friends”	demonstrates	this	skepticism	of	idyllic	friendship	by	noting	that	friendships	based	on	equality	are	rare;	rather,	men	longing	for	social	mobility	desire	friendships	of	reciprocity	with	men	of	higher	social	standing	(147).	Concerning	these	early	modern	untrustworthy	friendships,	Robert	C.	Evans	argues,	“Flattery	and	false	friendships	were	topics	that	preoccupied	many	people	during	the	Renaissance,	a	period	in	which	private	connections	were	even	more	important	than	today	in	determining	a	person’s	economic	success,	social	status,	and	even	his	deeper	sense	of	self-worth”	(1).	Likewise,	John	Cox	concludes	that	“social	inequality	and	competitive	rivalry”	(3)	made	the	classical	ideal	of	friendship	“impossible	to	achieve”	(3).			 Shakespeare	explores	the	complications	that	undercut	the	early	modern	ideals	of	friendship,	including	untrustworthy	or	false	friendships	in	his	poetry	and	plays.	He	portrays	relationships	of	false	amity	between	men	that	are	at	times	treacherous	but	nonetheless	an	integral	part	of	the	human	condition.	In	The	Tragedy	of	Richard	the	Third,	for	example,	Shakespeare	explores	the	betrayal	of	friendship	on	multiple	levels	through	the	protagonist	Richard,	Duke	of	Gloucester.	Richard	exploits	the	tenets	of	friendship	in	order	to	achieve	his	goal	of	becoming	king	of	England.	He	abuses	his	familial	relationships	with	his	brothers	Edward	IV	and	the	Duke	of	Clarence—whom	he	murders—and	his	friendship	with	his	political	ally	Buckingham,	who	also	falls	prey	to	Richard’s	duplicity.	Similarly,	yet	for	a	different	motive,	in	The	Two	Gentlemen	of	Verona,	Proteus	betrays	Valentine,	his	closest	friend,	for	the	love	of	Valentine’s	beloved,	Silvia.	Although	the	comedy	ends	in	reconciliation	between	the	two	men,	Proteus	nonetheless	abuses	his	friendship	with	Valentine	for	selfish	reasons.	In	these	two	plays	Shakespeare	demonstrates	that	intimate	
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friendships	between	men	can	come	into	question	when	presented	with	enticing	motives	such	as	political	or	personal	gain.			 No	play	of	Shakespeare’s,	however,	epitomizes	betrayal	of	male	friendship	as	does	
Othello,	the	Moor	of	Venice.	Unlike	the	unequal	bonds	of	amity	between	the	men	in	the	
Sonnets	and	The	Merchant	of	Venice	that	attempt	to	embrace	and	preserve	their	friendships	which	eventually	wane,	the	friendship	between	Othello	and	Iago	seems	at	first	to	correspond	on	several	levels.	Both	Othello	and	Iago	are	men	of	action;	they	are	seasoned	soldiers	who	maintain	a	reputation	of	valor	and	honesty.	They	confide	in	one	another	to	the	exemption	of	all	others.	They	reverentially	pledge	to	honor	kill	for	the	other.	To	most	everyone	around	them,	their	bond	appears	unbreakable.	As	Montaigne	so	eloquently	describes	the	truest	of	friendships,	their	souls	are	“mingled	and	confounded	so	universal	a	blending	that	they	efface	the	seam	which	joins	them	together	so	that	it	cannot	be	found”	(212).	Even	MacFaul	notes	that	Othello	and	Iago’s	friendship	is		“the	truest	relationship	either	man	has”	(169).	Yet	for	all	its	equality	and	closeness,	the	friendship	that	Iago	offers	Othello	is	nothing	more	than	exploitation	and	betrayal.	Furthermore,	he	maneuvers	his	friendships	with	Roderigo	and	Cassio	to	advance	his	agenda	of	duplicity	with	Othello.	The	principal	betrayal	of	friendship	occurs,	of	course,	between	Iago	and	Othello.	Iago,	the	overlooked	ancient	of	the	Moor,	fashions	himself	as	the	ideal	friend	to	Roderigo,	Cassio,	and	Othello	only	to	pervert	those	friendships	to	ultimately	manipulate	Othello’s	perception	and	self-doubt	regarding	his	wife	and	his	place	in	society	in	order	to	destroy	him.					 Whereas	the	characters	of	Richard	III	and	Proteus	have	more	defined	motives	for	their	betrayal,	Shakespeare’s	antagonist	Iago	lacks	the	explicit	motivation	for	his	perfidy.	For	centuries	critics	have	attempted	to	explain	the	motives	behind	Iago’s	traitorous	actions	
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toward	Othello.	As	early	as	the	nineteenth	century,	Samuel	Taylor	Coleridge	describes	Iago’s	actions	as	“motiveless	malignity”	(53),	while	other	critics	have	labeled	his	actions	Machiavellian	(Spivak	423-424),	Vice-like	(Silver	288),	and	psychopathic	(West	27).	Janet	Adelman	argues	that	racism	drives	Iago’s	actions:	“[It	is]	Othello	as	progenitor	that	first	excites	Iago’s	racializing	rage”	(129).	These	multiple	explanations	for	Iago’s	motives	originate	from	his	sadistic	machinations	toward	Othello	when	no	overt	reason	appears	to	justify	his	actions.			 Iago,	however,	claims	he	has	valid	reasons	for	wanting	to	destroy	Othello.	At	the	beginning	of	Act	1,	he	discloses	to	Roderigo,	Desdemona’s	rejected	suitor,	that	he	hates	the	Moor	because	he	selects	the	Florentine	Michael	Cassio	instead	of	him	to	be	his	lieutenant	(1.8-33).	At	the	close	of	Act	1,	Iago	offers	another	reason	why	he	detests	Othello:	“And	it	is	thought	abroad	that	twixt	my	sheets	/	He’s	done	my	office”		(1.388-389).	He	maintains	that	his	wife	Emilia	has	committed	adultery	with	Othello.	Iago’s	third	reason	involves	Desdemona;	he	claims	to	love	her	but	for	vengeful	motivations:		Now,	I	do	love	her	too,		Not	out	of	absolute	lust—though	peradventure	I	stand	accountant	for	as	great	a	sin—	But	partly	led	to	diet	my	revenge		For	that	I	do	suspect	the	lusty	Moor		Hath	leaped	into	my	seat.	(2.1.293-298)		Iago	offers	public	and	private	reasons	why	he	hates	his	commanding	officer	and	seeks	to	destroy	him,	but	according	to	Daniel	Stempel,	Iago’s	reasons	for	hating	Othello	“are	flimsy	rationalizations	that	have	little	do	with	either	fact	or	logic;	they	are	flotsam	tossed	up	from	
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depths	that	even	his	subtle	intellect	cannot	plumb”	(262).	The	supposed	scores	of	people	who	think	Emilia	has	cuckolded	Iago	never	materialize;	and	although	the	loss	of	the	lieutenancy	constitutes	a	tangible	slight,	Iago’s	actions	regarding	Othello	surpasses	extreme	retaliation.	Iago	claims,	“I	follow	him	to	serve	my	turn	upon	him”	(1.1.44),	but	his	actual	motives	remain	equivocal	at	best.	A.D.	Nuttall	argues	that	Iago	“is	not	motivated	like	other	people.	Instead,	he	decides	to	be	motivated”	(143).	Similarly,	Fred	West	maintains,	“His	[Iago’s]	motives—or	excuses—come	more	as	afterthoughts,	not	as	stimuli	towards	the	heinous	actions	he	perpetrates”	(29-30).	Regardless	of	his	motivations	or	lack	thereof,	Iago	chooses	to	abuse	his	friendships	with	Roderigo,	Cassio,	and	Othello	for	his	own	purpose.			 Iago’s	manipulation	of	his	three	supposed	friends	does	not	begin	with	Othello	but	rather	with	Desdemona’s	spurned	suitor	Roderigo.	Roderigo	falls	into	the	category	of	the	young,	lovesick	swain	who	never	quite	understands	that	he	as	no	chance	of	winning	Desdemona’s	love.	MacFaul	notes	that	“shared	enmity”	(182)	is	at	the	core	of	Roderigo	and	Iago’s	friendship.	This	may	be	the	reason	Roderigo	desires	a	relationship	with	Iago,	and	while	Iago	does	hate	Othello,	Roderigo’s	friendship	is	merely	a	means	to	an	end.	He	feels	no	real	regard	for	Roderigo.	In	Act	2	he	refers	to	the	young	man	as	a	“snipe”	(2.1.386)	who	falls	for	his	ploy.	Roderigo	functions	merely	as	a	puppet	whose	strings	Iago	can	pull	to	further	his	own	selfish	scheme.			 At	the	beginning	of	Act	I,	Iago	has	already	begun	tugging	Roderigo’s	strings	by	swindling	money	from	the	young	man	and	provoking	him	to	rouse	Brabantio	from	his	bed	to	enlighten	him	of	Othello	and	Desdemona’s	elopement.	Iago,	however,	cannot	resist	covertly	degrading	Othello	with	his	sexual	innuendos	he	hurls	at	Brabantio.	Concerning	Iago’s	need	to	be	privy	to	Othello’s	degradation,	Adelman	claims,	“Iago	legitimizes	and	
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intensifies	Brabantio’s	racism	through	his	initial	sexualizing	and	racializing	invocation	of	Othello”	(126).	While	this	is	certainly	true,	Iago	also	knows	that	Roderigo	lacks	the	nerve	to	confront	Brabantio	on	his	own.	Iago	must	serve	as	the	young	man’s	courage	by	proxy.	Roderigo’s	presence	also	allows	Iago	to	maintain	his	anonymity.	With	the	exception	of	Roderigo,	no	one	else	knows	that	he	instigates	the	search	for	Othello	and	Desdemona.	This	allows	Iago	to	play	the	outraged	friend	as	he	describes	Brabantio’s	reaction	to	Othello	and	Desdemona’s	elopement:	Nay,	but	he	prated,	And	spoke	such	scurvy	and	provoking	terms		Against	your	honor	That,	with	the	little	godliness	I	have,		I	did	full	hard	forbear	him.	(1.2.7-11)	Not	until	Act	5	does	anyone	realize	that	Iago	even	knows	Roderigo,	but	by	then,	Iago	has	done	irreparable	harm	to	both	him	and	Othello.			 When	Roderigo	realizes	that	Desdemona	is	actually	married,	he	reacts	like	the	lovesick	Petrarchan	stereotype	that	he	is	and	tells	Iago,	“I	will	incontinently	drown	myself”	(1.3.308).	Iago,	making	light	of	his	misery,	advises	Roderigo	to	amass	as	much	money	as	he	can	so	as	to	impress	Desdemona	after	she	sates	herself	with	Othello’s	body	and	realizes	that	she	that	no	longer	wants	the	Moor	for	a	husband	(1.3.342).	MacFaul	likens	the	Roderigo	and	Iago	exchange	to	Sir	Toby	and	Sir	Andrew	in	Twelfth	Night:	“In	both	cases	the	gull	thinks	he	can	get	a	woman	through	his	friend	and	spends	money	to	do	so”	(182).	Iago’s	advice	to	impress	Desdemona	with	wealth	is	only	a	ruse;	his	motive	is	to	filch	the	rest	of	Roderigo’s	fortune.	In	Act	5	when	Iago	plans	for	Roderigo	to	murder	Cassio,	he	notes	that	if	
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Cassio	does	not	kill	Roderigo,	he	will	have	to	answer	to	Roderigo	for	the	“gold	and	jewels	that...[he]...bobbed	from	him	as	gifts	to	Desdemona”	(5.1.16-17).	Iago’s	self-serving	attitude	toward	the	death	of	Cassio	and	Roderigo	demonstrates	his	lack	of	conscience	in	destroying	the	lives	of	the	men	he	pretends	to	befriend.	As	Aristotle	posits	in	Nicomachean	Ethics	regarding	friendships	of	dishonorable	men,	“Wicked	men	have	no	steadfastness	(for	they	do	not	remain	even	like	to	themselves),	but	become	friends	for	a	short	time	because	they	delight	in	each	other’s	wickedness”	(152).	Even	though	Iago’s	insincere	friendship	with	Roderigo	allows	him	to	take	advantage	of	Roderigo’s	naivety	and	swindle	him	out	of	his	money,	his	own	motives	toward	using	Roderigo’s	friendship	to	promote	his	agenda	with	Othello	remains	unclear.	Iago	himself	cannot	decide	for	what	reasons	he	pursues	his	cruelty	towards	Othello.	Perhaps	it	is	the	“delight”	(152)	in	his	own	wickedness	that	fuels	Iago’s	desire	to	continue	gulling	Roderigo	under	the	pretense	of	amity.		 After	Roderigo’s	breakdown	regarding	Desdemona,	Iago	reiterates	his	friendship	to	the	young	man:	“I	have	professed	me	thy	friend”	(1.3.339).	He	declares	this	to	Roderigo	only	because	Iago	wishes	to	keep	him	invested	in	his	love	for	Desdemona	for	his	“sport	and	profit”	(1.3.387).	Iago	soon	realizes,	however,	that	the	young	man	functions	as	the	perfect	dupe	to	aid	him	in	discrediting	Cassio	in	the	eyes	of	Othello.	Iago	fuels	Roderigo’s	rage	against	Cassio	by	insisting	that	Cassio	and	Desdemona	are	lovers.	This	allows	Iago	to	exploit	the	young	man’s	desperation	in	order	to	persuade	him	to	kill	Cassio	while	Iago	agrees	to	kill	Othello.	He	convinces	Roderigo	that	murder	is	the	only	way	he	can	obtain	Desdemona.			 In	contrast,	Roderigo	views	Iago	as	a	sympathizing	confidante	who	shares	his	animosity	toward	Othello.	Their	mutual	hatred	binds	the	two	men	and	allows	Iago	to	
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fashion	a	distorted	friendship	of	reciprocity.	They	both	wish	to	destroy	Othello	for	their	own	selfish	agenda.	As	Aristotle	claims,	even	men	who	lack	virtue	may	share	friendships	of		“utility”	(146),	but	the	friendship	only	lasts	as	long	as	“some	advantage	come	from	the	relation”	(146).	Iago,	however,	never	actually	considers	Roderigo	a	friend;	he	lacks	the	ability	to	form	any	honest	connection	with	another	person.	But	because	Iago	plays	the	role	of	the	commiserating	friend	in	such	convincing	terms,	Roderigo	never	questions	his	motives,	even	though	he	is	privy	to	Iago’s	machinations	for	plans	to	kill	Cassio	and	destroy	Othello.	Instead,	Roderigo	views	Iago	as	his	avenging	angel	who	possesses	the	power	to	destroy	the	black	devil	Othello;	he	becomes	his	“second”	in	the	duel	with	Othello	for	Desdemona’s	love.	Because	Roderigo	believes	the	Moor	has	wronged	him	and	Iago,	he	views	their	collusions	as	justified.	He	never	realizes	that	Iago’s	friendship	is	nothing	more	than	an	exploitation	of	his	gullibility	until	Iago	pulls	the	sword	from	his	body.			 Iago’s	manipulation	of	friendship	continues	with	Michael	Cassio.	The	Florentine’s	promotion	as	lieutenant	to	Othello	serves	as	Iago’s	inciting	incident.	Prior	to	Othello	choosing	Cassio	as	his	second	in	command,	Iago	had	been	lobbying	for	the	position	with	“three	great	ones	of	the	city”	(1.1.9).	When	he	discovers	that	he	has	been	passed	over	for	advancement,	he	cites	favoritism	over	substance.	He	tells	Roderigo	that	Cassio	is	nothing	more	than	a	“great	arithmetician”	(1.1.20)	who	“never	set	a	squadron	in	the	field”	(1.1.23).	He	declares	indignation	that	he	must	resort	to	being	“his	Moorship’s	ancient”	(1.1.34).		 Even	though	Iago	claims,	“Preferment	goes	by	letter	and	affection,	/	And	not	by	old	gradation,”	(1.1.37-38),	Othello’s	selections	aptly	fit	both	men’s	dispositions.	In	Leonard	Digges’s	1579	Stratioticos,	he	describes	the	offices	of	both	lieutenant	and	ensign:	
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As	it	is	conuenient	for	euery	Souldior	to	stand	upon	hys	credite	and	reputation,	accounting	no	losse	of	goodes	comparable	to	a	dishonorable	foile:	so	out	especiallye	this	Officer	to	whom	the	charge	of	Ensigne	is	committed,	aboue	al	other	to	haue	honorable	respect	of	his	charge...Let	the	Ensigne	be	a	man	of	good	account,	honest	and	vertuous....The	Lieutenants	office,	as	it	is	of	credite	and	reputation,	so	it	is	also	an	office	of	great	toile	and	paine,	the	which	he	ought	willingly	to	suffer,	as	wel	to	discharge	his	Captaine	of	toile,	as	for	his	own	reputation...He	should	in	all	factions	and	questions	among	the	souldiers	be	altogither	Neutrall,	and	lovingly	to	worke	with	them	for	
pacification,	if	he	cannot	by	curtesie	frame,	let	him	communicate	the	matter	with	his	Captaine,	and	then	faithfully	execute	his	Captains	direction	(93-94).	The	most	notable	description	of	the	ensign	is	“honest”	(93).	Iago	upholds	a	reputation	for	honesty	but	not	neutrality,	which,	according	to	Digges,	is	a	prerequisite	for	a	lieutenant.	Although	considered	forthright,	Iago’s	honesty	borders	on	rudeness.	Cassio	refers	to	him	as	“bold	Iago”	(2.1.77),	while	Desdemona	considers	him	a	“most	profane	and	liberal	counselor”	(2.1.163-164).	Even	Iago	says	of	himself,	“For	I	am	nothing	if	not	critical”	(2.1.121).	Cassio,	in	contrast,	is	a	man	of	learning,	good	breeding,	and	courtly	manners.	At	one	point	he	apologizes	to	Iago	for	his	“bold	show	of	courtesy”	(2.1.101)	towards	his	wife	Emilia.	Even	though	Iago	refers	to	Cassio	as	“rash	and	very	sudden	in	choler”	(2.1.274),	his	description	lacks	creditability	since	he	is	speaking	to	Roderigo.	Iago’s	honest	persona	he	has	created	for	himself	backfires;	he	has	made	himself	worthy	of	the	position	of	ensign.	Nevertheless,	Iago	refuses	to	acknowledge	Cassio’s	abilities	and	his	own	shortcomings;	instead,	he	believes	himself	superior	to	Cassio	if	not	in	education	but	in	manipulation,	and	
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he	seeks	retribution	against	the	man	who	occupies	the	position	that	he	believes	only	he	deserves.	Ironically,	Iago	manipulates	his	and	Cassio’s	notable	characteristics	to	form	an	unlikely	bond	of	friendship	between	them.	Iago’s	“honesty”	influences	Cassio	to	confide	in	the	ensign	when	he	disgraces	himself	with	Othello.	He	seeks	Iago’s	counsel	to	help	him	re-establish	his	relationship	with	the	general.	Iago,	however,	plays	upon	Cassio’s	reputation	with	the	ladies	to	discredit	him	in	the	eyes	of	Othello.	When	Cassio	displays	courtly	courtesy	to	Desdemona,	his	overt	attentiveness	does	not	go	unchecked	by	Iago:	“He	takes	her	by	the	palm.	Ay,	well	said	whisper.	With	as	little	a	web	as	this	will	I	ensnare	as	great	a	fly	as	Cassio”	(2.1.167-169).	Iago’s	perceptiveness	regarding	the	lieutenant’s	unconcealed	admiration	for	Desdemona	allows	him	to	take	full	advantage	of	Cassio	with	him	none	the	wiser.	This	also	gives	Iago	the	opportunity	to	manipulate	Othello’s	perception	of	Cassio	and	Desdemona’s	relationship	by	introducing	the	idea	of	impropriety	to	him,	not	through	explicit	words	but	by	innuendo.	By	the	end	of	Act	I,	Iago	formulates	his	strategy	to	destroy	Othello	by	discrediting	not	only	Cassio	but	also	Desdemona:	Cassio’s	a	proper	man.	Let	me	see	now:	To	get	his	place	and	to	plume	up	my	will	In	double	knavery—How,	how?	—Let’s	see;	After	some	time,	to	abuse	Othello’s	ear	That	he	is	too	familiar	with	his	wife.	He	hath	a	person	and	a	smooth	dispose	To	be	suspected,	framed	to	make	women	false.		The	Moor	is	of	a	free	and	open	nature,	That	thinks	men	honest	that	but	seem	to	be	so,	
		54	
And	will	as	tenderly	be	led	by	the	nose	As	asses	are.	(1.3.393-403)	Before	he	can	become	Othello’s	only	confidant,	however,	Iago	must	sour	Othello’s	good	opinion	of	Cassio’s	judgment	and	leadership	ability,	which	consequently	will	make	Iago’s	lies	and	insinuations	of	the	alleged	affair	more	credible	to	Othello.	Iago	must	taint	Othello’s	friendship	with	Cassio	in	order	for	Iago	to	commiserate	with	Cassio	and	to	fashion	himself	as	Othello’s	only	trustworthy	friend.	Iago’s	friendly	invitation	to	Cassio	to	join	him	for	a	drink	with	him	and	some	“Cyprus	gallants”	(2.3.28)	sets	the	stage	for	his	betrayal.	Moments	before	Iago’s	offer,	Othello	reminds	the	young	lieutenant	of	his	duty:	“Good	Michael,	look	you	to	the	guard	tonight.	/	Let’s	teach	ourselves	that	honorable	stop	/	Not	to	outsport	discretion	(2.3.1-3).	For	Othello,	duty	and	honor	come	before	revelry,	and	as	Othello’s	second-in-command,	he	fully	expects	Cassio	to	act	appropriately.	As	Julia	Genster	argues,		The	lieutenant	is	the	place	holder	for	his	commanding	officer.	The	lieutenant	is	at	once	a	sign	of	his	commander’s	power	and	a	powerful	reminder	of	his	potential	absence,	since	the	lieutenant	either	receives	the	commands	of	his	superior	officer	or	substitutes	for	him.	In	choosing	a	subordinate	a	captain	is,	in	effect,	choosing	a	second	self;	he	is	empowering	someone	to	play	him,	to	be	him	in	his	absence.	(786)	The	importance	Othello	places	on	Cassio’s	position	gives	Iago	the	opportunity	to	disgrace	Cassio	and	elevate	himself	in	the	general’s	estimation.	When	Iago’s	lackey	Roderigo	instigates	a	confrontation	with	the	drunken	lieutenant	and	Montano’s	good-willed	interference	leads	to	a	brawl	between	the	two	men,	Othello	relies	on	Iago’s	honesty	to	give	him	an	accurate	account	of	the	skirmish.	Iago,	claiming	he	would	rather	experience	bodily	
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harm	than	“do	offense”	(2.3.216)	to	Cassio,	grudgingly	recounts	the	events	of	the	night	to	Othello.	While	Iago	gains	favor	with	Othello	for	his	“honesty,”	Cassio,	in	turn,	loses	his	reputation	with	the	general.	Although	he	still	considers	Cassio	a	friend	and	regrets	having	to	punish	him,	Othello	does	not	hesitate	to	strip	him	of	his	title:	“Cassio,	I	love	thee,	/	But	nevermore	be	officer	of	mine”	(2.3.242-243).	Since	Cassio	is	the	general’s	“second	self”	(Genster	786),	Othello’s	strong	sense	of	integrity	cannot	allow	a	man	to	represent	him	who	does	not	exercise	good	judgment.	Although	Othello’s	anger	toward	Cassio’s	lapse	incites	him	to	remove	him	from	his	position,	Othello	does	not	immediately	bestow	Cassio’s	title	to	Iago.	Cassio’s	humiliation,	however,	places	Iago	a	step	closer	to	becoming	Othello’s	only	confidant	and	ultimate	betrayer.		 Because	he	feigns	remorse	over	his	testimony	that	facilitates	Cassio’s	demotion,	Iago	preserves	his	friendship	with	the	young	man.	Iago	commiserates	with	him	over	his	loss	and	manipulates	him	into	petitioning	Desdemona	for	help	to	regain	Othello’s	favor.	Employing	the	same	tactic	he	uses	on	Roderigo,	Iago	expresses	his	devotion	as	a	friend	in	Cassio’s	bleakest	moment	by	declaring,	“I	think	you	think	I	love	you”	(2.3.305).	This	declaration,	while	seemingly	conveying	feelings	of	amity	toward	Cassio,	actually	demonstrates	Iago’s	contempt	for	Cassio’s	gullibility	regarding	their	relationship.	Cassio	does	not	consider	that	Iago	may	resent	him	for	being	chosen	for	the	lieutenancy.	While	in	his	drunken	state,	Cassio	even	jokes	with	Iago	about	his	position	of	authority	over	him.	He	lightheartedly	reminds	Iago,	when	speaking	to	him	about	the	salvation	of	souls,	“The	lieutenant	is	to	be	saved	before	the	ancient”	(2.3.	104-105).	He	never	views	Iago	as	a	legitimate	contender	for	the	position,	and	Iago	hates	him	for	it.	From	the	beginning,	Iago	has	viewed	himself	as	superior	to	Cassio	and	Othello.	As	Ken	Jacobson	argues,	“Iago	criticizes	Othello	and	Cassio,	
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respectively,	on	two	points	where	he	believes	himself	to	be	their	superior:	rhetoric	and	strategy”	(497).	Consequently,	Iago’s	strategy	consists	of	manipulating	both	men	through	the	rhetoric	of	friendship,	which	is	why	Cassio	believes	Iago	is	merely	assuring	him	of	his	affection	toward	him	as	a	friend.	For	this	reason,	Cassio	heeds	Iago’s	advice	to	speak	with	Desdemona	in	hopes	of	restoring	his	reputation	with	Othello.			 Iago’s	suggestion	for	Cassio	to	plead	his	case	to	Desdemona	sets	both	people	on	a	path	of	destruction	they	do	not	choose	for	themselves.	Unwittingly,	Cassio’s	eagerness	to	bring	himself	once	again	into	Othello’s	good	graces	clouds	his	judgment	when	he	implores	Desdemona	to	intervene	on	his	behalf,	and	Desdemona’s	desire	for	Othello	and	Cassio	to	reconcile	will	muddy	hers	to	the	possible	appearance	of	impropriety	when	she	so	fervently	entreats	Othello	to	restore	Cassio	to	his	position.	With	their	energies	focused	on	one	another,	Iago	seizes	the	perfect	opportunity	to	poison	Othello	toward	both	his	wife	and	his	friend	by	insinuating	there	is	more	than	friendship	between	them.	Like	Claudius,	Iago	plans	to	“pour	pestilence”	(2.3.350)	into	the	ear	of	the	Moor.22		 By	involving	Desdemona	in	his	plan,	Iago	plots	to	disgrace	her	and	to	usurp	her	position	as	Othello’s	intimate.	He	acknowledges	Desdemona’s	sway	over	Othello;	she	is	the	general’s	general	(2.3.308-309).	Moreover,	Iago	understands	that	Othello’s	trusting	nature	will	permit	him	to	deceive	Othello	by	convincing	him	by	a	series	of	“proofs”	that	Desdemona	has	cuckolded	him	with	Cassio.	Othello’s	wife	and	closest	friend	will	be	disgraced;	he	will	have	no	other	person	in	which	to	confide.	Because	of	his	“honest”	reputation	and	his	supposed	loyalty	to	his	general,	Iago	will	serve	as	Othello’s	only	confidant	by	default;	he	will	become	the	general’s	general.																																																									22	See	John	Wall’s	“Shakespeare’s	Aural	Art:	The	Metaphor	of	the	Ear	in	Othello”	for	an	in	depth	look	regarding	the	significance	of	the	ear	in	Othello.		
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	 Iago’s	plot	to	poison	Othello	toward	Desdemona	and	Cassio	begins	not	with	accusations	but	with	feigning	friendship	and	insinuations.	His	insinuations	are	so	slight	that	Othello	at	first	ignores	them.	When	Iago	sees	Cassio	and	Desdemona	talking	together,	he	utters	in	front	of	Othello,	“Ha?	I	like	not	that”	(3.3.35)	indicating	that	something	seems	amiss	between	the	two.	Like	his	ploy	to	appear	uncomfortable	when	recounting	the	lieutenant’s	indiscretion	with	Roderigo	and	Montano	to	Othello,	Iago	pretends	not	to	want	to	draw	attention	to	Cassio’s	behavior	with	Desdemona;	yet	by	this	pretense,	he	intentionally	brings	their	actions	to	the	foreground	where	Othello	notices	and	causes	him	to	question	what	he	sees	and	hears	regarding	the	lieutenant	and	his	wife.	His	pretense	of	being	the	caring	friend	gives	credibility	to	his	intimations.		 The	uncertainty	that	Othello	feels	toward	his	wife	and	Cassio	does	not	originate	with	Iago’s	intimations	but	rather	with	his	own	insecurities.	Cassio,	arguably	Othello’s	closest	friend,	was	an	integral	part	of	his	courtship	of	Desdemona;	he	actively	participated	in	her	acceptance	of	Othello’s	suit,	which	suggests	that	he	spent	time	alone	in	Desdemona’s	company.	As	Harry	Berger	Jr.	notes,	“Othello	resorts	to	a	go-between	because	he’s	an	outsider	who	lacks	confidence	and	who	sees	in	Cassio	everything	that	he	himself	is	not:	white,	young,	handsome,	elegant,	always	at	ease	among	the	likes	of	Desdemona”	(11).	Cassio’s	involvement	in	Othello	and	Desdemona’s	relationship,	which	once	produced	a	seeming	intimacy	among	the	three	friends,	now	generates	suspicion	for	Othello	regarding	Cassio’s	true	intentions	toward	Desdemona.	Berger	explains	the	threesome	as	a	“triangular	structure	of	fantasy,	desire,	and	distrust...already	in	place	before	the	play	began”	(12).	This	distrust	sets	the	stage	for	Iago	to	transform	himself	from	honest	soldier	to	trustworthy	friend	of	Othello	by	manipulating	Othello’s	anxiety	toward	Cassio	and	Desdemona’s	
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relationship.	Unfortunately,	when	Desdemona	attempts	to	intercede	on	Cassio’s	behalf,	she	only	exacerbates	Othello’s	misgivings	when	she	speaks	of	the	lieutenant’s	assistance	in	winning	her	love:	Michael	Cassio,	That	came	a-wooing	with	you,	and	so	many	a	time,		When	I	have	spoke	of	you	dispraisingly,		Hath	ta’en	your	part—to	have	so	much	to	do	To	bring	him	in!	(3.3.76-80)	Desdemona’s	repeated	attempts	to	facilitate	reconciliation	between	her	husband	and	his	friend	make	her	appear	overeager	on	Cassio’s	behalf.	While	her	intentions	are	pure,	her	execution	lacks	discernment	regarding	Othello’s	uncertainties	about	her	love	toward	him.	This	lack	of	judgment	only	aids	Iago’s	scheme	by	making	her	appear	guilty	of	indiscretions	in	the	eyes	of	Othello.	Later	in	the	play,	Iago	suggests	Othello	observe	carefully	her	desire	to	have	Cassio	reinstated,	“Note	if	your	lady	strain	his	entertainment	/	With	many	strong	or	vehement	importunity;	/	Much	will	be	seen	in	that”	(3.3.266-268).	Although	Iago	goads	Othello	into	believing	that	impropriety	exists	between	Cassio	and	Desdemona,	his	manipulations	would	not	have	worked	so	adeptly	had	not	Othello	already	felt	some	anxiety	about	the	relationship	between	Cassio	and	his	wife.		 Another	indication	of	Othello’s	reservations	regarding	Cassio	and	Desdemona	occurs	in	Act	1	when	the	Duke	instructs	Othello,	“Leave	some	officer	behind,	/	And	he	shall	our	commission	bring	to	you”	(1.1.183-184).	Othello,	instead	of	choosing	Cassio	to	protect	Desdemona,	selects	Iago	to	safeguard	his	wife.	He	never	explains	why	he	does	not	choose	his	second-in-command	and	closest	friend	to	protect	the	person	he	loves	more	than	his	
		59	
own	life.	Cassio	is	the	logical	choice	since	he	is	both	friend	to	Othello	and	Desdemona,	yet	Othello	is	also	aware	of	his	friend’s	amorous	reputation.	Othello’s	decision	may	simply	be	one	of	convenience	since	it	is	Iago’s	wife	Emilia	that	attends	to	Desdemona;	however,	it	could	indicate	that	he	does	not	completely	trust	the	handsome	lieutenant	with	his	new	wife.	As	in	Shakespeare’s	Sonnets,	a	triangle	of	love	does	not	end	well	for	at	least	one	person	involved.	Perhaps	Othello	sees	Cassio	as	the	young,	beautiful	man	who	could	threaten	his	relationship	with	Desdemona.	Othello’s	friendship	with	Cassio	does	not	withstand	the	pressure	of	possible	cuckolding.	Instead,	Othello	chooses	his	“honest”	ancient,	a	married	man	and	a	person	with	whom	Desdemona	would	undoubtedly	never	cheat.		 	Although	Desdemona	appears	by	all	indications	to	love	Othello	completely,	both	her	father	and	Iago	question	her	trustworthiness,	which	eventually	arouses	Othello’s	already	present	fears.	When	he	chooses	to	marry	Desdemona,	Othello’s	decision	to	elope	likely	stems	from	his	fear	of	rejection.	He	understands	that	Brabantio	would	never	consent	to	their	marriage	for	at	least	three	reasons:	he	is	much	older	than	Desdemona,	he	is	not	of	the	same	social	status	as	she,	and	most	importantly,	he	is	not	of	the	same	race	as	she.	Brabantio’s	reaction	to	their	marriage	confirms	his	fears.	Although	his	decision	to	elope	contradicts	his	sense	of	honor,	Othello’s	need	for	Desdemona’s	love	supersedes	any	loyalty	of	friendship	he	feels	towards	Brabantio;	however,	it	might	also	indicate	that	Othello	is	not	as	confident	of	Desdemona’s	love	as	he	professes.	On	some	level	of	consciousness,	he	must	acknowledge	that	he	has	wooed	a	young,	impressionable	woman	who	falls	in	love	with	him	for	the	dangers	he	has	survived.	He	must	also	recognize	his	outsider	status	in	society	and	know	the	only	way	he	can	possess	Desdemona	is	through	deception,	which	she	
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wholeheartedly	supports.	The	fact	that	Desdemona	willingly	betrays	her	father	gives	Brabantio	opportunity	to	sow	a	seed	of	doubt	in	Othello’s	mind	when	he	cautions	his	new	son-in-law,	“Look	to	her,	Moor,	if	thou	hast	eyes	to	see.	She	has	deceived	her	father,	and	may	thee”	(1.3.195-196).	Brabantio’s	warning	concerning	Desdemona’s	faithlessness	will	later	haunt	Othello’s	suspicious	mind	when	Iago	presents	the	idea	of	his	friend	Cassio	and	Desdemona	committing	adultery.		The	uncertainty	of	Cassio’s	loyalty	as	a	friend	when	it	comes	to	wooing	women	leads	Othello	to	second-guess	the	relationship	between	his	lieutenant	and	his	wife.	Brabantio’s	prediction	also	provides	Iago	the	opportunity	to	reinforce	her	father’s	prediction	of	her	betrayal	when	he	reminds	Othello,	“She	did	deceive	her	father,	marrying	you;	/	And	when	she	seemed	to	shake	and	fear	your	looks,	/	She	loved	them	most"	(3.3.19-21).	Iago	capitalizes	on	the	insecurities	Othello	already	feels	toward	his	new	bride	to	highlight	the	picture	he	eventually	paints	of	his	best	friend	cuckolding	his	new	wife.			 Nevertheless,	despite	his	reservations,	Othello	agrees	to	hear	Cassio’s	plea	for	reinstatement	solely	for	Desdemona’s	sake.	This	is	the	moment	when	Iago	begins	fashioning	himself	as	Othello’s	confidant	by	displaying	concern	over	what	he	supposedly	sees	happening	between	Cassio	and	Desdemona.	He	begins	by	asking	Othello	a	seemingly	innocuous	question:	“Did	Michael	Cassio,	when	you	wooed	my	lady,	/	Know	of	your	love?”	(3.3.103-104).	Iago’s	supposed	innocent	inquiry	brings	Othello’s	suspicions	to	the	surface.	When	Othello	asks	him	the	purpose	for	his	questions,	Iago	downplays	his	reasons,	which	only	fuels	Othello’s	curiosity	to	the	point	of	anger	as	he	retorts,		Think,	my	lord?”	By	heaven,	though	echo’st	me,		As	if	there	were	some	monster	in	thy	thought		
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Too	hideous	to	be	shown.	Thou	doest	mean	something.		I	heard	thee	say	even	now,	though	lik’st	not	that,	When	Cassio	left	my	wife.	What	didst	not	like?		And	when	I	told	thee	he	was	of	my	counsel	In	my	whole	course	of	wooing,	thou	cried’st	“Indeed?”	And	didst	contract	and	purse	your	lips	together	As	if	though	then	hadst	shut	up	in	thy	brain	Some	horrible	conceit.	(3.3.118-127)	At	first	Othello	appears	not	to	hear	Iago’s	offhand	remark,	or	he	does	not	deem	it	significant	enough	to	respond.	Iago’s	lack	of	communication,	however,	provokes	Othello	to	admit	that	he	not	only	heard	Iago	but	also	shares	his	misgivings	regarding	the	exchange	between	Cassio	and	Desdemona.	Iago’s	brief	questions	supports	what	Othello	already	thinks,	which	is	why	he	reacts	so	forcefully	towards	Iago’s	evasiveness.	Othello	cites	their	bond	of	friendship	as	a	reason	to	gain	access	to	Iago’s	opinions	when	he	says,	“If	you	dost	love	me,	/	Show	me	thy	thought”	(3.3.127-128).	Unlike	with	Roderigo	and	Cassio,	Iago	has	no	need	to	bring	friendship	into	the	equation	as	a	way	to	influence	Othello;	instead,	Othello	himself	demands	that	Iago	prove	his	devotion	to	him	by	revealing	his	thoughts	about	Cassio	and	Desdemona.	Later	in	Act	3	Othello	declares,	“Though	dost	conspire	against	thy	friend,	Iago,	/	If	though	but	think’st	him	wronged	and	mak’st	his	ear/	A	stranger	to	thy	thoughts”	(3.3.155-157).	This	is	the	first	time	the	word	friendship	is	used	to	describe	their	association,	and	Othello	is	the	one	to	utter	it.	For	Othello,	Iago	is	becoming	the	only	individual	he	can	trust.	He	needs	reassurance	from	Iago	that	their	relationship	serves	as	his	anchor	in	a	sea	of	uncertainty.	
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	 Iago’s	assurance	of	his	love,	however,	provides	only	more	doubt	for	Othello.	When	Iago	says,	“My	lord,	you	know	I	love	you”	(3.3.129)	Othello	replies,	“I	think	though	dost”	(3.3.130)	indicating	that	he	finds	it	difficult	to	know	for	certain	if	he	can	rely	on	his	own	judgment.	The	wife	and	friend	he	thought	he	could	trust	show	signs	of	disloyalty,	which	gives	rise	to	his	uncertainty	about	Iago.	Still,	Othello	clings	to	Iago’s	reputation	as	an	honest	man	to	tell	him	the	truth,	yet	paradoxically	he	fears	what	Iago	will	say.			 Whereas	Iago	belittles	the	need	for	reputation	with	Cassio	when	he	tells	him,	“Reputation	is	an	idle	and	most	false	imposition,	oft	got	without	merit	and	lost	without	deserving”	(2.3.262-264),	with	Othello	he	claims	that	he	does	not	wish	to	lose	his	reputation	by	speculating	about	Cassio	and	Desdemona’s	relationship.	He	tells	Othello,	Who	steals	my	purse	steals	trash;	tis	something,	nothing;	‘Twas	mine,	‘tis	his,	and	has	been	slave	to	thousands;	But	he	that	filches	from	me	my	good	name	Robs	me	of	that	which	not	enriches	him		And	makes	me	poor	indeed.	(3.3.170-174)	Iago	knows	that	Othello’s	character	insists	on	honesty	and	integrity,	and	he	wishes	to	underscore	the	fact	that	while	his	reputation	is	intact,	Cassio’s	status	as	a	man	of	honor	is	in	question.	Cassio’s	reputation	already	suffers	from	his	predilection	for	the	fairer	sex,	but	Iago	succeeds	in	blemishing	his	name	further	as	Othello’s	disgraced	lieutenant.	By	putting	so	much	emphasis	on	his	own	“honest”	character,	Iago	reinforces	Othello’s	need	to	rely	on	his	friendship	since	he	cannot	rely	on	Cassio’s,	which	in	turn	permits	Iago	to	lead	Othello	“by	the	nose	/	As	asses	are”	(1.3.402-403).	
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	 From	the	onset	of	the	play,	to	help	him	become	both	Othello’s	sole	confidant	and	surrogate	“wife,”	Iago	has	been	skillfully	leading	Othello	down	the	path	of	alienation	while	playing	the	loyal	friend.	He	employs	Othello’s	own	isolating	qualities	to	sever	him	completely	from	the	Venetian	community.	He	begins	by	using	the	Venetians’	already	prejudiced	view	of	Othello’s	blackness	to	taint	his	character	for	all	to	see	while	he,	Iago,	hides	in	the	shadows.	Starting	with	Desdemona’s	father,	Iago	racializes	Othello	and	Desdemona’s	marriage	to	him	and	incites	Brabantio	to	bring	to	light	what	he	views	as	the	black	monstrous	conjurer	who	has	bewitched	his	innocent	daughter	with	his	demonic	charms.	The	confrontation	that	ensues	between	Othello	and	Brabantio	in	front	of	the	Duke	and	his	court	further	alienates	Othello	from	the	Venetians.	Even	though	the	Duke	makes	a	calculated	decision	to	absolve	Othello	based	upon	his	and	Desdemona’s	testimony	and	the	Duke’s	need	for	Othello’s	assistance	to	eradicate	the	more	dangerous	threat	of	the	Turks,	the	Venetian	community	now	has	justification	to	partake	of	the	prejudice	they	already	feel	toward	the	outsider	who	has	absconded	with	one	of	their	own.	Adelman	notes,	“Iago	needs	to	make	him	into	a	black	monster,	invading	the	citadel	of	whiteness”	(129).	According	to	Iago,	Brabantio’s	friends	have	supported	him	in	his	case	against	the	Moor,	and	others	of	the	court	likely	resent	Othello	for	eloping	with	a	young	white	woman	of	means,	regardless	of	the	Duke’s	judgment.	Through	Iago’s	interference,	Brabantio	reinforces	Othello’s	otherness	and	sets	him	further	apart	from	Venetian	society.			 Although	Brabantio	alienates	Othello	through	the	manipulations	of	Iago,	it	is	Othello	who	unconsciously	sets	himself	apart	from	Venetian	society	in	terms	of	his	own	abilities.	According	to	MacFaul,	“Othello’s	greatness	separates	him	from	the	rest	of	mankind,	accentuated	in	his	case	by	his	racial	difference	from	the	play’s	other	characters”	(186).	
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When	Brabantio	accuses	him	of	sorcery,	Othello	is	unconcerned.	He	believes	his	reputation	will	exonerate	him	from	any	penalty.	He	says	as	much	to	Iago,	“Let	him	do	his	spite.	/	My	services	which	I	have	done	the	seigniory	/	Shall	out-tongue	his	complaints”	(1.218-19).	Othello	cites	his	military	prowess	as	proof	that	his	worthiness	outweighs	Brabantio’s	disapproval	of	his	marriage	to	Desdemona.	He	refuses	to	rely	on	any	kind	of	friendly	affiliation	to	keep	the	Duke	from	punishing	him;	instead,	he	relies	upon	his	own	performance	as	military	leader	to	exonerate	him	of	any	misdeeds.	Othello	wishes	to	remain	independent	and	complete	in	his	own	right;	but	by	doing	so,	he	exposes	himself	to	conjecture	and	speculation	from	the	Venetian	community	about	him	as	a	person	and	a	husband	to	Desdemona.	According	to	Edward	Berry,	“Once	the	Turkish	threat	is	removed,	Othello	is	left	vulnerable	both	within	and	without,	prey	to	the	complex	interaction	of	psychological	and	social	forces	that	occasion	his	downfall”	(325).	Iago,	of	course,	is	the	progenitor	of	those	forces	that	ultimately	bring	about	Othello’s	downfall,	and	he	accomplishes	this	under	the	guise	of	friendship.		 Iago	solidifies	his	position	as	Othello’s	only	true	friend	by	promising	to	produce	visual	proof	that	Desdemona	has	cuckolded	Othello	with	Cassio,	and	his	pièce	de	résistance	culminates	with	Desdemona’s	handkerchief.	The	handkerchief,	a	wedding	gift	from	Othello	given	to	him	by	his	mother,	signifies	more	than	just	a	token	of	affection.	It	is	the	object	Othello	claims	will	magically	secure	his	love	to	Desdemona	(3.4.57-70),	and	it	is	the	final	link	in	Iago’s	chain	of	deception	that	will	tether	the	“green-eyed	monster”	(3.3.179)	that	Othello	becomes	and	will	lead	him	to	the	brink	of	madness.	Almost	from	the	beginning,	Iago	has	planned	to	use	the	handkerchief	as	proof	of	Desdemona’s	infidelity.	Iago’s	wife	Emilia,	when	finding	the	lost	article,	remarks,	“My	wayward	husband	hath	a	hundred	times	/	
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Wooed	me	to	steal	it”	(3.3.308-309).	Iago’s	insinuations	have	ignited	a	jealous	fire	in	the	Moor,	and	Othello’s	token	of	affection	becomes	the	catalyst	for	which	his	jealousy	will	burn	out	of	control.	Iago	declares,	“Trifles	light	as	air	/	Are	to	the	jealous	confirmations	strong	/	As	proof	of	Holy	Writ”	(3.3.338-340).	Even	though	the	“ocular	proof”	(3.3.376)	of	the	handkerchief	is	circumstantial	at	best,	by	the	time	Othello	sees	the	so-called	evidence	in	Bianca’s	hands,	he	is	primed	to	convict	his	wife	and	friend	because	of	Iago’s	deception.			 Before	Othello	sees	Desdemona’s	handkerchief	in	the	possession	of	Cassio’s	paramour,	Iago’s	eyes	serve	as	Othello’s	surrogate	vision.	Because	he	has	transferred	all	the	trust	he	once	had	for	Cassio	and	Desdemona	to	Iago,	Othello	indicts	the	couple	on	what	Iago	tells	him,	not	shows	him.	The	visual	imagery	Iago	calls	forth	of	Cassio’s	supposed	dream	in	which	he	plies	Desdemona	with	sweet	words	and	kisses	is	enough	to	eradicate	any	doubt	Othello	has	of	their	innocence.	When	Iago	reassures	Othello,	“Nay,	this	was	but	his	dream”	(3.3.442),	Othello	replies,	“But	this	denoted	a	foregone	conclusion”	(3.3.443).	Iago	drives	the	arrow	of	his	revenge	home	to	the	heart	of	Othello	when	he	asks	him	if	he	has	ever	noticed	the	“handkerchief	/	Spotted	with	strawberries”	(3.3.440-450)	that	Desdemona	sometimes	carries.	When	Othello	replies	that	he	gave	it	to	her,	Iago	says,	“I	am	sure	it	was	your	wife’s—did	I	today	/	See	Cassio	wipe	his	beard	with”	(3.3.353-354).	This	fictional	evidence	of	Iago’s	pinpoints	the	moment	of	no	return	for	Othello.	He	does	not	wait	for	actual	visual	proof;	instead,	Othello	calls	on	the	forces	of	the	underworld	to	turn	his	love	to	hate:	“Arise	black	vengeance,	from	the	hollow	hell!	/	Yield	up,	O	love,	thy	crown	and	hearted	throne	/	To	tyrannous	hate!”	(3.3.462-464).	Othello’s	unnatural	hatred	toward	Desdemona	likewise	plunges	him	over	the	precipice	of	insanity.	
		66	
	 Othello’s	violent	reaction	to	Iago’s	evidence	does	not	stem	from	his	wife’s	infidelity	alone.	Othello	appointed	Cassio	his	“second	self”	(Genster	786)—a	concept	of	friendship	presented	by	Aristotle23—and	by	Iago	framing	him	as	the	fictitious	lover	of	Desdemona,	he	creates	a	betrayal	for	Othello	so	immense	that	his	sense	of	honor	cannot	process	it.	For	Desdemona	to	cuckold	him	with	another	man	is	unforgivable,	but	to	commit	adultery	with	Cassio	is	a	betrayal	of	both	a	marriage	and	a	friendship.	In	Othello’s	eyes,	Cassio	has	replaced	him	in	the	one	position	that	he	has	no	right	to	fulfill,	that	of	Desdemona’s	lover.	Every	doubt	and	insecurity	that	Othello	has	ever	felt	about	his	wife	and	Cassio	comes	rushing	to	the	surface,	and	his	extreme	reaction	is	one	of	desperation.	According	to	Felicity	Rosslyn,	“His	[Othello’s]	violence	is	really	a	side-effect	of	that	frenzied	search	for	security”	(9).	Losing	the	sanctuary	of	his	marriage	leaves	Othello	alone	and	seeking	someone	to	punish,	and	the	obvious	choice	is	the	two	people	he	believes	is	responsible—Desdemona	and	Cassio.		 Reminiscent	of	Macbeth’s	incapability	of	erasing	his	bloody	deeds	against	Duncan	with	“all	great	Neptune’s	ocean”	(Macbeth	2.2.64),	Othello	cannot	stem	the	flood	of	his	bloody	vengeance	against	Cassio’s	supposed	betrayal	as	his	friend	and	his	wife’s	alleged	infidelity	as	he	vows:		 	 	 Like	to	the	Pontic	Sea,	Whose	icy	current	and	compulsive	course	Ne’er	feels	retiring	ebb,	but	keeps	due	on		To	the	Propontic	and	the	Hellespont,	Even	so	my	bloody	thoughts	with	violent	pace																																																									23	“A	friend,	being	another	self,	furnishes	what	a	man	cannot	provide	by	his	own	effort”	(176).	
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Shall	ne’er	look	back,	ne’er	ebb	to	humble	love,	Till	that	a	capable	and	wide	revenge	Swallow	them	up.	(3.3.469-476)	Othello’s	need	for	retribution	arises	from	his	own	strict	sense	of	honor,	his	impaired	judgment	regarding	Desdemona’s	innocence,	and	his	own	insecurities.	Even	though	she	has	proved	her	love	for	him	by	deserting	her	father,	rejecting	other	suitors	such	as	Roderigo,	and	pronouncing	her	love	for	him	in	front	of	the	Venetian	court,	Iago’s	fabricated	evidence	has	so	corrupted	Othello’s	mind	that	Desdemona’s	virtuousness	only	enrages	him	further	since	he	cannot	reconcile	what	he	knows	of	her	and	what	“honest”	Iago	has	produced	as	proof	of	her	perfidy.	According	to	Berry,	“Othello	projects	his	self-loathing	upon	her.	In	his	diseased	imagination	she	becomes,	paradoxically,	the	stereotype	of	the	Moor:	cunning,	‘black,’	sexually	depraved,	and	diabolic”	(328).	Othello’s	own	anxieties	about	himself	spills	over	into	a	deluge	of	anger	for	being	deceived	by	one	so	seemingly	innocent	yet	so	apparently	false	as	Desdemona.	For	such	a	deception,	Othello	believes	he	must	exercise	what	he	considers	justice;	that	is,	he	will	sentence	to	death	the	black-hearted	sorceress	who	has	bewitched	him	body	and	soul.	Only	then	can	he	be	free	of	her	charms.	That	Othello	so	easily	believes	Iago’s	lies	demonstrates	his	compromised	judgment	but	only	because	he	feels	the	loss	so	much	more	deeply	since	he	literally	has	no	one	except	Iago	on	which	he	can	rely.	The	security	to	which	Othello	clings	will	be	the	friendship	and	loyalty	Iago	offers.			 Iago’s	perverted	form	of	amity	he	initially	offers	Othello	resembles	that	of	a	confidant,	an	Horatio-like	position	of	subordination	which	offers	a	trustworthy	ear	on	which	Othello	can	depend.	Iago’s	resemblance	to	Horatio,	however,	ends	there.	Whereas	Horatio	acquiescently	supports	Hamlet’s	actions,	Iago	leads	Othello	by	declaring	to	his	
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general	that	even	though	Othello	commands,	“I	prithee,	speak	to	me	as	to	thy	thinkings”	(3.3.144),	Iago	claims	he	is	not	obliged	to	verbalize	his	thoughts,	“Good	my	lord,	pardon	me.	/	Though	I	am	bound	to	every	act	of	duty,	/	I	am	not	bound	to	that	all	slaves	are	free	to”	(3.3.146-148).	Iago	adeptly	provokes	Othello	to	beg	him	to	speak	his	mind.	This	is	his	way	of	convincing	Othello	that	he	is	an	unwilling	participant	in	Desdemona	and	Cassio’s	disgrace,	which	makes	him	a	more	reliable	witness	to	their	supposed	adultery.			 Not	content	to	be	only	Othello’s	friend	and	confidant,	Iago	must	also	usurp	Desdemona’s	place	as	“wife”	to	Othello.	From	the	beginning	of	Othello	and	Desdemona’s	marriage,	Iago	has	recognized	Desdemona’s	power	over	the	Moor.	As	long	as	she	is	in	Othello’s	good	graces,	her	opinion	and	counsel	matter	to	him;	however,	by	discrediting	her	completely,	she	can	no	longer	influence	Othello,	which	allows	Iago	to	slip	easily	into	her	position	as	Othello’s	surrogate	“spouse.”	When	Othello	kneels	and	swears	a	“sacred	vow”	(3.3.477)	to	seek	revenge	for	Desdemona	and	Cassio’s	betrayal,	Iago	seizes	the	opportunity	to	kneel	in	unison	and	make	his	own	vow	to	Othello.	Like	a	bride	to	a	groom,	he	pledges,		Witness	that	here	Iago	doeth	give	up	The	execution	of	his	wit,	hand,	heart,	To	wronged	Othello’s	service.	Let	him	command,		And	to	obey	shall	be	in	me	remorse,		What	bloody	business	ever.	(3.3.480-485).	Iago’s	promise	reflects	a	perverted	form	of	the	marriage	vows.24	Here	he	presents	his	body	and	soul	for	Othello	to	command.	By	Othello	agreeing	“with	acceptance	bounteous”	(3.3.486)	to	Iago’s	pledge,	the	two	men	consciously	become	“one	flesh”	(Genesis	2:24KJV)																																																									24	Critics	such	as	Robert	C.	Evans	(16),	John	N.	Wall	(362),	and	Tom	MacFaul	(188)	all	refer	to	the	resemblance	of	Othello	and	Iago’s	vows	to	that	of	a	wedding	ceremony.	
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in	their	bloody	vow	of	murder.	Although	Iago	places	himself	in	the	“female”	position	of	subordination	by	promising	to	obey	Othello,	it	is	Othello	who	will	satisfy	the	role	of	submissive	“wife.”	According	to	Iago,	Desdemona	has	already	usurped	Othello’s	position	as	general	to	the	general	(2.3.308-309).	Even	Cassio	refers	to	Desdemona	as	“our	great	captain’s	captain”	(2.1.77).	Finally,	Othello	himself	declares	of	Desdemona,	“Perdition	catch	my	soul	/	But	I	do	love	thee!	And	when	I	love	thee	not,	/	Chaos	is	come	again”	(3.3.98-100).	Othello	has	consistently	surrendered	his	position	of	power	to	Desdemona,	and	without	her,	his	world	is	anarchy.	With	Iago	supplanting	Desdemona,	he	will	rule	Othello’s	heart	and	mind	by	pretending	to	help	restore	order	to	Othello’s	universe	by	ridding	it	of	Desdemona	and	Cassio.			 Although	the	idea	of	Iago	and	Othello	becoming	“one	flesh”	constitutes	a	subversion	of	the	marriage	vows,	it	mirrors	an	ideal	quality	of	friendship	offered	by	Michel	de	Montaigne.	In	his	essay	“On	affectionate	relationships”	Montaigne	describes	the	perfect	friendship	between	two	men	as	“souls...yoked	together”	(213)	and	“one	soul	in	bodies	twain”	(214).	While	“one	flesh”	and	“one	soul”	may	not	be	explicitly	equivalent,	to	be	of	“one	flesh”	implies	more	than	the	physical;	it	transcends	if	not	to	the	spiritual	at	least	to	the	emotional.	Accordingly,	this	mingling	of	souls	that	Montaigne	portrays	as	the	ultimate	form	of	friendship	transcends	any	relationship	between	men	and	women	since	women’s	souls,	according	to	him,	are	incapable	of	an	enduring	the	“holy	bond	of	friendship”	(210).	Hence,	Iago’s	subversion	of	the	marriage	vows,	although	not	obviously	similar,	is	in	fact	a	manipulation	of	this	ideal	symbiotic	relationship	between	two	men.	It	is	also	a	perversion	of	the	relationship,	however,	since	they	establish	this	unholy	bond	of	friendship	on	the	blood	of	Desdemona	and	Cassio.	Nevertheless,	their	blood	oath	is	enough	for	Othello	to	see	
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Iago	as	his	“second	self”	(Genster	786),	which	is	why	Othello	declares,	“Now	art	thou	my	lieutenant”	(3.3.494),	effectively	establishing	Iago	as	both	his	right	hand	and	his	soul	mate.		 Once	Iago	successfully	gains	Othello’s	complete	devotion,	he	again	abuses	his	friendship	with	Cassio	to	present	the	visual	confirmation	of	Desdemona	and	Cassio’s	infidelity	that	Othello	demands.	Playing	the	part	of	the	comrade,	Iago	teases	Cassio	about	Bianca,	all	the	while	permitting	Othello	to	believe	that	Desdemona	is	the	topic	of	their	conversation.	With	Desdemona’s	handkerchief	in	hand,	Cassio	laughs	to	scorn	the	rumor	Iago	repeats	regarding	possible	nuptials	between	him	and	Bianca.	Iago’s	ease	of	camaraderie	with	Cassio	allows	him	to	manipulate	the	young	man	into	incriminating	himself	in	the	eyes	of	Othello	by	joking	about	his	paramour.			 Othello’s	reaction	to	the	scene	Iago	sets	is	unexpected.	Cassio’s	apparent	indifference	to	Desdemona’s	love	actually	leaves	Othello	feeling	compassionate	toward	his	wife,	and	it	is	up	to	Iago	to	dispel	any	thoughts	of	sympathy	Othello	experiences.	When	Othello	says	of	Cassio,	“I	would	have	him	nine	years	a-killing.	A	fine	woman!	A	fair	woman!	A	sweet	woman!”	(4.1.180-181),	Iago	tells	him,	“Nay,	you	must	forget	that”	(4.1.182).	Othello	immediately	reverses	his	sympathetic	attitude	and	says,	“Ay,	let	her	rot	and	perish,	and	be	damned	tonight,	for	she	shall	not	live”	(4.1.184-185).	Iago’s	rule	over	Othello	is	supreme;	he	can	no	longer	think	for	himself.	Like	an	obedient	beast,	he	submits	to	Iago	without	question.	Even	when	Othello	proposes	poison	to	murder	Desdemona,	Iago	instructs	him,	“Strangle	her	in	her	bed,	even	the	bed	she	hath	contaminated”	(4.1.209-210),	reversing	his	earlier	position	from	not	harming	Desdemona	to	sexualizing	her	assassination.	Transforming	into	the	mindless	monster	that	Iago	has	birthed	through	his	machinations	of	deceit,	Othello	disregards	any	possible	signs	that	Desdemona	is	innocent	of	
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Iago’s	accusations.	When	Othello	confronts	Emilia	about	Desdemona’s	fidelity,	he	ignores	her	vehement	denial	and	accuses	her	of	acting	as	Desdemona’s	bawd.	Through	Iago’s	influence,	Othello	transforms	into	the	vulgar,	lascivious	individual	that	Iago	has	always	been.	In	a	perverse	way,	Iago	and	Othello	have	never	been	closer.	They	are	becoming	one	in	mind,	yet	ironically	Othello	believes	they	are	one	in	honesty,	loyalty,	and	justice.	He	cannot	fathom	that	Iago’s	mind	is	set	on	annihilating	him,	yet	he	is	the	eager	participant	of	his	own	demise.		 Their	single-minded	efforts	come	to	a	head	when	Othello	and	Iago	set	their	plans	in	motion	to	kill	Cassio	and	Desdemona.	Characteristic	of	his	duplicity,	Iago	manipulates	Roderigo	to	kill	Cassio	so	that	either	Cassio	or	Roderigo	or	both	will	die	thereby	keeping	his	treachery	hidden.	When	Othello	hears	Cassio	cry,	“I	am	maimed	forever.	Help,	ho!	Murder!	Murder!”	(5.1.27),	he	feels	a	deep	affection	for	Iago’s	sacrifice	for	him,	and	it	motivates	him	to	honor	his	blood	oath.	He	says,		‘Tis	he.	O	brave	Iago,	honest	and	just,	That	hast	such	noble	sense	of	thy	friend’s	wrong!	Thou	teachest	me.	—Minion,	your	dear	lies	dead,	And	your	unblest	fate	hies.	Strumpet	I	come.	Forth	of	my	heart	those	charms,	thine	eyes,	are	blotted;		Thy	bed,	lust-stained,	shall	with	lust’s	blood	be	spotted.	(5.1.32-37)	Iago’s	presumed	success	in	killing	Cassio	leaves	Othello	no	choice	but	to	murder	Desdemona	since	he	is	too	honorable	to	renege	on	his	promise.	Iago’s	actions	give	Othello	the	courage	to	finish	what	he	thinks	Iago	has	initiated	on	his	behalf.		
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	 For	Othello,	the	revelation	of	Iago’s	deceit	strikes	him	almost	as	deeply	as	the	murder	of	Desdemona.	After	he	strangles	his	wife	in	her	bed	and	admits	freely	to	Emilia	his	complicity	in	her	death	and	Iago’s	assistance	in	revealing	her	adultery,	Emilia	realizes	in	horror	the	extent	of	her	husband’s	treachery.	She	questions	Othello	repeatedly	asking,	“My	husband?”	(5.2.156).	Exasperated	by	her	response,	Othello	replies,	“He,	woman;	/	I	say	thy	husband.	Dost	understand	the	word?	/	My	friend,	thy	husband,	honest,	honest,	Iago”	(5.2.159-161).	Even	after	Desdemona’s	death,	Othello	feels	only	justification	for	his	actions	and	believes	Iago	has	done	him	a	faithful	service.	It	is	not	until	Emilia	exposes	her	husband	for	his	deceit	in	discrediting	Desdemona	that	Othello	realizes	the	extent	of	Iago’s	deception.	What	he	believed	to	be	a	justified	killing	has	now	become	a	brutal	homicide.	Othello	cannot	reconcile	his	faithful	friend	with	the	traitorous,	false	individual	that	stands	before	him,	but	even	after	Emilia’s	revelation	Othello	calls	Iago,	“Precious	villain!”	(5.2.243)	as	he	tries	to	run	him	through.	The	oxymoronic	description	of	Iago	represents	Othello’s	binary	emotions	of	love	and	hate	that	he	experiences	as	he	attempts	to	reconcile	at	that	moment	Iago’s	culpability	in	his	downfall.	He	asks	of	Lodovico,	“Will	you,	I	pray,	demand	that	demi-devil	/	Why	he	hath	thus	ensnared	my	soul	and	body?”	(5.2.310).	Like	Brabantio’s	accusations	of	devilry	toward	Othello,	Othello	now	accuses	Iago	of	bewitching	him.	How	else	could	Iago	deceive	him	so	effortlessly?	Iago,	however,	refuses	to	explain	his	actions.	Like	every	other	motive	in	the	play,	the	audience	and	Othello	will	remain	ignorant	of	his	actual	provocations.	It	is	as	though	Iago	himself	cannot	fully	comprehend	his	reasons	for	wanting	to	destroy	so	many	lives.	On	the	one	hand,	Iago’s	hatred	for	Othello	is	evident,	yet	he	seems	to	need	Othello’s	approval	even	while	he	is	trying	to	destroy	him.	He	purposely	becomes	Othello’s	closest	friend	and	confidant,	which	seem	to	suggest	that	on	some	level	of	
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consciousness	he	longs	for	a	intimate	relationship	with	Othello,	yet	he	recognizes	his	inability	to	experience	a	genuine	connection	to	another	human	being.	This	inability	to	connect,	in	turn,	feeds	his	rage	and	hatred	toward	the	person	his	both	admires	and	envies;	therefore,	he	will	remain	forever	silent	and	leave	Othello	to	contemplate	and	profoundly	regret	his	friendship	with	him.			 When	Othello	describes	himself	as	“one	that	loved	not	wisely	but	too	well”	(5.2.354),	the	audience	naturally	assumes	that	he	is	speaking	of	his	love	for	Desdemona,	and	he	obviously	is;	yet	his	words	could	certainly	characterize	his	feelings	toward	Iago.	No	doubt	Othello	loved	Iago	for	his	supposed	commitment	to	their	friendship.	His	willingness	to	kill	for	Othello’s	honor	linked	them	in	a	close-knit	bond	of	mutuality.	So	while	his	love	for	Iago	was	foolish,	the	fact	that	Othello	experienced	what	he	thought	was	“one	soul	in	bodies	twain”	(Montaigne	214)	is	a	relationship	that	any	human	being	endeavors	to	achieve.	His	suicide,	while	representing	his	regret	for	his	horrible	actions	toward	Desdemona,	could	also	symbolize	not	only	his	shame	for	not	recognizing	Iago’s	feigned	friendship	but	also	his	regret	over	the	loss	of	that	friendship.	As	Francis	Bacon	surmised,	“For	there	is	no	man	that	imparteth	joys	to	his	friend,	but	he	joyeth	the	more;	and	no	man	that	imparteth	his	griefs	to	his	friend,	but	he	grieveth	the	less”	(83).	Othello’s	grief	is	two-fold:	the	loss	of	both	his	wife	and	his	best	friend	plunges	him	into	the	depths	of	heartache	from	which	he	cannot	return.	Indeed,	Othello	“loved	not	wisely	but	too	well”	(5.2.354).		 Shakespeare’s	exploration	into	friendship	betrayed	in	Othello	demonstrates	the	tenuous	position	of	the	idealized	qualities	of	amity	embraced	by	early	modern	writers.		Of	the	qualities	of	friendship	venerated	by	the	early	modern	man—virtue,	equality,	symbiosis,	and	stability—Othello	undercuts	them	by	exposing	the	vulnerabilities	of	man’s	
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capability	to	distinguish	between	a	faithful	friend	and	a	self-serving	individual	willing	to	take	advantage	of	a	person’s	weaknesses	to	further	his	own	agenda.	Othello	posits	the	question	as	to	whether	authentic	friendship	actually	exists.	If	a	character	such	as	Iago	can	deceive	an	honorable	man	such	as	Othello	to	such	a	degree,	what	hope	exists	for	true	amity?	Shakespeare	does	not	leave	the	audience	empty-handed,	however.	Cassio’s	faithfulness	to	Othello	gives	a	glimmer	of	hope	that	although	individuals	may	not	adhere	to	every	idealistic	quality	of	friendship,	true	friendship	does	exist.	Walter	Dorke,	an	early	modern	writer,	once	noted	in	Tipe	or	Figure	of	Friendship,	“A	man	may	as	soone	see	a	black	Swan	as	find	out	a	faithfull	friend”	(4).	Yet	the	yearning	for	true	friendship	spurs	every	human	being	to	search	for	that	mingling	of	souls	that	the	early	modern	writers	such	as	Montaigne	revered.	 												
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CONCLUSION	
	 Over	the	course	of	this	thesis,	I	have	attempted	to	demonstrate	how	Shakespeare	presents	early	modern	perceptions	of	idealized	friendship	only	to	confront	and	challenge	the	precepts	in	order	to	present	a	realistic	representation	of	real-life	friendship.	In	Chapter	One,	“An	Exposition	of	Inequity:	Disparities	of	Friendship	in	The	Merchant	of	Venice,”	Shakespeare	presents	disproportions	of	affection	between	Antonio	and	Bassanio	and	exposes	the	vulnerabilities	of	their	friendship	through	the	calculations	of	Shylock	and	Portia.	In	Chapter	Two,	“False	Friends:	Betrayal	of	Friendship	in	Othello,	the	Moor	of	
Venice,”	Shakespeare’s	character	Iago	exploits	the	idealized	tradition	of	early	modern	amity	in	order	to	betray	Othello.	These	chapters	present	imperfect	or	false	forms	of	friendship;	paradoxically,	they	also	reveal	an	authentic	view	of	true-to-life	friendship.		 By	exposing	the	limitations	of	idealized	friendship,	Shakespeare	indicates	that	there	is	no	idealized	friendship.	He	is	not,	however,	suggesting	that	friendship	itself	is	an	illusion;	rather,	the	constructs	for	perfect	friendship	are	fictional.	If	the	constructs	are	fictional,	then,	how	do	we	discern	true	friendship?	When	we	consider	The	Merchant	of	
Venice,	for	example,	how	do	we	know	that	Antonio’s	affection	for	Bassanio	is	genuine?	We	know	because	of	his	actions	toward	the	young	man.	He	freely	gives	Bassanio	money	with	little	to	no	hope	of	repayment.	He	bargains	his	own	flesh	as	collateral	for	Bassanio’s	loan.	He	willingly	sacrifices	himself	for	his	friend.	As	John	15:13	says,	“Greater	love	hath	no	man	than	this,	that	a	man	lay	down	his	life	for	his	friends”	(KJV).		Time	and	again,	Antonio	proves	himself	a	friend	to	Bassanio,	yet	he	receives	no	tangible	reciprocation	of	affection	from	the	young	man.		
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	 Although	Bassanio	declares	that	he	loves	Antonio,	“But	life	itself,	my	wife,	and	all	the	world	/	Are	not	with	me	esteemed	above	thy	life”	(Merchant	4.1.281-283),	his	actions	belie	his	words.	Like	the	prodigal	son	of	the	New	Testament,	Bassanio	squanders	not	only	his	money	but	also	Antonio’s.	He	has	no	way	to	repay	his	debts	except	to	gamble	more	of	his	friend’s	money.	When	Bassanio	leaves	for	Belmont	in	hopes	of	winning	Portia’s	hand	in	marriage,	he	forgets	Antonio’s	existence	until	the	merchant’s	letter	arrives	requesting	some	sign	of	Bassanio’s	affection	before	he	dies.	By	all	indications,	Bassanio	has	no	real,	lasting	love	for	Antonio.			 In	juxtaposing	the	actions	of	Antonio	and	Bassanio,	Shakespeare	presents	the	audience	with	an	imperfect	friendship	that	seems	doomed	to	failure	because	of	the	disparity	of	love	between	the	two	friends.	Yet	by	exposing	the	realities	of	friendship,	Shakespeare	gives	us	a	glimpse	of	what	true-life	friendship	could	possibly	be	if	love	between	friends	were	fully	reciprocated.	Ironically,	the	mutuality	of	affection	needed	to	sustain	a	friendship	is	part	of	the	“fictional”	construct	Shakespeare	exposes.			 	Shakespeare	again	presents	idealized	friendship	in	Othello,	the	Moor	of	Venice	only	to	undermine	the	tradition.	We	must	ask	ourselves,	how	can	Shakespeare	give	a	faithful	representation	of	the	nature	of	true	friendship	in	a	play	about	betrayal	between	friends?	From	the	beginning	of	the	play,	we	are	aware	of	Iago’s	machinations	toward	Othello,	and	we	watch	in	dread	as	he	abuses	his	friendships	with	Roderigo,	Cassio,	and	Othello	in	order	to	promote	his	twisted	vendetta.	We	fear	him	because	his	actions	so	closely	resemble	that	of	a	true	friend.	We	are	troubled	that	his	outward	show	of	affection	is	only	a	thin	veneer	covering	the	darkness	of	his	intentions.	How	can	we	discern	genuine	amity	when	someone	
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so	malevolent	can	deceive	an	honorable	man	such	as	Othello	to	such	a	degree?	What	hope	exists	for	genuine	friendship?			 Although	Iago	feigns	his	affections	toward	his	so-called	friends,	he	plays	such	a	convincing	role	that	if	we	were	not	aware	of	his	intentions,	he	would	epitomize	the	perfect	friend.	MacFaul	notes	that	Othello	and	Iago’s	friendship	is	“the	truest	relationship	either	man	has”	(169).	Though	I	agree	with	his	assessment,	it	is	difficult	to	comprehend	how	a	friendship	that	is	not	real	can	be	considered	true,	but	we	have	to	remember	how	Othello	views	Iago.	After	believing	Desdemona	is	unfaithful	with	Cassio,	Othello	turns	to	Iago	for	support	and	friendship;	he	becomes	Othello’s	lifeline.	In	a	distorted	version	of	honor,	Iago	“proves”	his	love	to	Othello	by	agreeing	to	kill	for	him.	Though	he	is	only	pretending	to	be	his	friend,	in	a	perverse	way,	Iago	experiences	a	friendship	of	mutuality	with	Othello.	The	words	that	pass	between	the	two	men	and	the	moments	of	intense	honesty,	at	least	on	the	part	of	Othello,	creates	an	illusion	of	friendship	that	when	it	is	gone,	the	loss	plunges	Othello	into	the	depths	of	heartache	from	which	he	cannot	return.	When	Othello	demands	to	know	why	Iago	betrayed	their	friendship,	his	response	is	one	of	silence.	There	are	no	words	when	the	friendship	is	destroyed.	Although	it	seems	unlikely	that	Shakespeare	can	use	betrayal	between	friends	as	way	to	express	qualities	of	genuine	friendship,	he	shows	that	even	a	false	friendship	has	moments	of	mutuality.	If	nothing	else,	Shakespeare’s	gives	us	relationships	that	are	more	authentic	than	any	model	of	perfect	amity	since	they	reveal	what	is	instead	of	what	could	be.		 In	The	Merchant	of	Venice	and	Othello,	the	Moor	of	Venice,	Shakespeare	holds	up	a	mirror	for	us	to	see	the	good,	the	bad,	and	the	ugly	of	human	friendship.	While	he	presents	us	with	early	modern	perceptions	of	idealized	friendship,	his	intention	is	for	us	to	see	them	
		78	
as	fictions	of	amity.	He	is	not	disregarding	the	importance	of	virtue	and	mutuality	between	friends;	he	is	merely	providing	us	with	realistic	expectations	of	friendships	between	imperfect	human	beings.	Friendships	do	exist,	but	they	do	not	occur	in	a	vacuum.	They	must	live	and	breathe,	and	sometimes	they	must	die.	While	they	are	illusive	and	sometimes	difficult	to	sustain,	they	are	as	precious	as	life	itself.	To	reiterate	Polonius’s	quote	from	
Hamlet,	“Those	friends	thou	hast,	and	their	adoption	tried,	/	Grapple	them	unto	thy	soul	with	hoops	of	steel”	(1.3.62-3).										
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